NORDIC COOPERATION ON CIVIL SECURITY: THE ‘HAGA’ PROCESS 2009-2014

BY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The years of economic misfortune since 2009 have not been happy ones for European cooperation in general. Coping with the ‘Euro-crisis’ has stretched the European Union’s capacities and its members’ solidarity to the limit, reducing the energy available for accepting new burdens and risks in the security field among others. Obliged to retreat from Afghanistan, NATO now faces serious challenges to its competence, resolve, and unity on its home territory in Europe, following the Ukraine crisis. Both in the EU and NATO, enlargement has slowed down and possibly hit some limits after Croatia’s double accession.

After the EU and NATO both grew beyond 20 members in 2004, it was logical to suppose that regional sub-groups and local variations within their large expanse might become more significant. One good effect of such a development could be to allow sets of states with a stronger collective drive and/or greater needs to move ahead with innovation in fields not requiring absolute uniformity – and then to provide leadership or a model for wider European progress.1 In the economic context, for example, several commentators have pointed to the Nordic region’s relatively strong performance in weathering the post-2008 crisis and have wondered if wider lessons could be learned.2

It is, however, not only in that sphere that the five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) can claim to have made progress in a time of general stagnation.

1 This possibility is formally recognized by the EU as ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Treaty of Amsterdam) and ‘permanent structured cooperation’ (in defence, Treaty of Lisbon).

Starting in 2008-9 but building on earlier foundations, they have taken several important steps in tightening their security-related cooperation: in operations using military assets, in the defence industry, but also in civil emergency handling and other aspects of non-military security. For a group of five states that still have contrasting formal security statuses – Denmark, Iceland and Norway being in NATO and Sweden and Finland, non-allied – and whose first-degree security challenges are actually quite diverse, success in these areas is by no means self-explanatory.

What does explain the Nordic decision to make new efforts in these fields; what has actually been achieved so far; and what are the challenges for further progress? This paper will apply those questions to the last-mentioned field of Nordic collaboration: civil security cooperation, which has found its highest-level and most comprehensive reflection within the ‘Haga’ process – so called because the guiding declaration was adopted at the Haga royal estate outside Stockholm in April 2009, launching a series of high-level meetings that continues annually. This process has attracted much less media, political, and academic attention internationally than the military-related developments; yet its practical significance for Nordic citizens may ultimately be greater as it focuses on readiness for non-warlike emergencies that do and will occur, rather than military contingencies that hopefully will not. Nordic governments themselves have recognized the importance of the former tasks by adopting ‘societal security’ – the safety and wellbeing of society itself and its citizens, rather than mere territorial control – as their overall security doctrine, and by paying special attention to the functionality (practical and psychological) of society under stress.

In this paper we shall look at how the Haga process fits into the evolution of this Nordic approach; at the mixture of motives behind the seminal Haga meeting in 2009; at the details of what it involves, the results it can claim so far and the factors that may shape its continuation. The necessary minimum will be said about defence-related Nordic cooperation to illuminate any causal connections, and provide a sense of the

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4 The word ‘societal’ is not used in the same way in Danish and Finnish doctrine but the intent and content is the same. Alyson JK Bailes, ‘Societal Security and Small States’ in Clive Archer, Alyson JK Bailes and Anders Wivel, Small States and International Security: Europe and beyond (London: Routledge, 2014).
relationship – competing, parallel, or mutually reinforcing – between the military and civil cooperation processes.

Further – and not least because the Nordics themselves view their coordinated positions as an input to larger cooperation processes – we shall consider the possible significance of the Haga process in a Europe-wide, Baltic-wide, and Arctic-wide perspective. Is it possible that, just as NATO today is calling for local examples of ‘smart defence’ collaboration and integration, there may be an emerging Nordic model of ‘smart emergency management’ or ‘smart societal security’? Alternatively, is Norden (the short name for the five Nordic states and their autonomous territories collectively) merely catching up with others; or reacting to and improving its handling of a distinct regional responsibility? These interpretations will be weighed and judged in the final conclusions.

Regarding methodology, this study is designed to contribute as much to public knowledge of ‘Haga’, and to practitioners’ reflection on its meaning and effectiveness, as to the body of academic literature. It may fill a gap in the latter simply because so little has been written, in any mode, about the Haga process up to now. Nevertheless, we have consciously taken an empirical and historical, rather than theoretical, approach and have reserved our attempts at analysis for understanding and evaluating policy developments. The main sources used are, accordingly, the Haga documents themselves (and similar official sources); an extensive series of interviews with the concerned officials in five countries; and the authors’ different degrees of personal involvement in the process. A minimum of literature references are provided as necessary, notably in the background sections.

The paper has five further sections, starting with a short background review of Nordic cooperation that takes the story up to 2008. Section III then sets the scene for the Haga I declaration of 2009 and discusses its genesis, its contents and the short-term follow-up. Section IV covers the reappraisal that took place in 2012-13, leading to the Haga II statement adopted at Vaxholm, Sweden, in 2013: why was this ‘re-launch’ necessary and what did it achieve? How well was the new orientation reflected in the 2014 Oslo Ministerial meeting? Section V looks at the relevance of Haga to, and its interconnection with, wider civil/societal security cooperation processes at European, Nordic/Baltic, and pan-Arctic level. Finally, section VI attempts to place Haga within the broader stream of Nordic developments; to probe its more general strengths, weaknesses and prospects; and to attempt answers to the questions above about its ‘model’ function. For ease of

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5 All interviews were conducted with highly placed officials in the Haga ministries and related agencies: 3 individuals in Denmark, 5 in Finland, 2 in Iceland (one interviewed twice), 4 in Norway and 5 in Sweden. As agreed with the informants, they are not identified in this study by name. Where necessary, information drawn from their interviews is attributed to ‘practitioners’ or simply ‘our informants’.
reference and to facilitate further research, English translations or summaries of five key Haga documents are provided in the Annexes.
II. BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND MOTIVES

II.1 A little Nordic history

As already pointed out, the five Nordic states have made sometimes quite diverse choices in security and defence despite the similarities in their sizes, geo-strategic positioning, internal political systems and culture. During World War Two their experiences ranged from Allied invasion (Iceland and the Faroes) and German invasion (Denmark and Norway), through neutrality (Sweden), to a ‘hot war’ with Soviet forces (Finland). For a brief period in the 1940s the possibility of a local defence pact between the four Westernmost states was discussed, but in 1949 Denmark, Iceland and Norway decided in favour of becoming founder members of NATO. Throughout the Cold War period this created a contrast between their formal status and that of Sweden and Finland, who maintained their neutrality and non-alignment (later preferentially described as ‘non-allied’ status).

On paper this might make Norden look like a sharply divided region, but the reality was quite different, to a degree that made it sui generis in the wider Euro-Atlantic system. The non-confrontational relations between the Nordics themselves, and the buffering provided by two peaceful and prosperous non-Allies, helped to create a ‘Nordic peace’ that might stand as a model of Karl Deutsch’s ‘pluralistic security communities’, but was also often interpreted also as a ‘Nordic balance’ resting precisely on the countries’ different defence statuses. The three Nordic NATO members helped further to damp

7 The reference is to Karl W. Deutsch et al. (1957), Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience.
down super-power tensions in the region by declining to accept any nuclear objects or (in Denmark’s and Norway’s cases) any long-term stationing of foreign troops on their soil, while NATO military exercises were also held back to a certain distance from the Norwegian-Russian land and sea frontier in the High North.

The Nordic states quickly showed their determination to remain partners and friends in a more positive way, by launching a systematic process of Nordic Cooperation in the early 1950s and solemnizing it with the Helsinki Agreement of 1962. At the core of the process was and remains a joint parliamentary Nordic Council – with an unbroken series of meetings since 1953 - but since 1971 a Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) has also met both at ministerial and sometimes at summit (Prime Ministers’) level. Despite the constraints of a sui generis relationship with Moscow, Finland joined the process only slightly after its Nordic neighbours, in 1955. In 1997 a separate West Nordic Council (WNC), also in the form of a joint parliamentary body, was created to allow Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes to discuss their shared concerns; it formalized parliamentary contacts that had begun some time earlier, and is associated with the regional funding mechanism NORA (North Atlantic Cooperation).  

While matters of defence and traditional (‘hard’) security were at first clearly excluded from the remit of Nordic Cooperation, the Helsinki Treaty of 1962 opened the door to working together in fields now considered vital for civil or societal security – such as transport safety, environment protection and public health – by approving direct contact between relevant regional/sectoral authorities in the different states. Consultation, mutual learning and voluntary harmonization of good practice in such fields would not have to go through the diplomatic channels of foreign ministries every time, and could be pursued in a low-key way that minimized both local and possible external sensitivities. The formalization of a Nordic Passport Union further eased the human contacts involved, while the membership of all Nordic states in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) ensured a compatible commercial framework. From the early 1990s when more emphasis was put on ‘high political’ dialogue in the NCM, general matters of international security including the process of European integration could also be discussed at that level.

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9 See http://www.vestnordisk.is/Apps/WebObjects/SW.woa/wa/dp?id=1295.
10 Details at http://www.nora.fo.
11 An earlier attempt to create a free-standing Nordic economic union (NORDEK) was abandoned in 1970. Denmark joined the EU in 1973. Norway and Iceland joined the European Economic Area in 1994, ensuring that when Finland and Sweden also joined the EU in 1995, all five Nordic states still enjoyed mutual free trade within the Single Market.
12 One frequent topic at this time was the coordination of Nordic sovereignty- and security-related assistance to the Baltic States, which covered all fields of governance but included significant military assistance. Current Nordic/Baltic relations are discussed in section V below.
II.2 Defence cooperation

The lack of formal intra-Nordic defence dialogue and cooperation does not mean that it was ever completely absent. A recent literature has explored military/strategic contacts that existed in wartime and persisted discreetly during the Cold War, notably between Norway and Sweden. More to the point for our present purpose, the shared interests and similar approaches of the four Nordic states who engaged in military peace-keeping gave ground for consultation and coordination among defence ministers, who could of course raise other issues in the margins when they met. In 1997 this grouping was acknowledged by inaugurating an annual defence ministers’ report to the Nordic Council, and shortly afterwards a large-scale Nordic cooperative security research programme was launched. Peacekeeping cooperation was meanwhile formalized in the NORDCAPS framework where the UK also became a partner (Nordic contingents were often attached to UK forces on specific peace missions). In 2000 the Nordic countries set up a Nordic Brigade as a joint peace-keeping force. In 2004 three of the Nordic countries, Sweden, Norway and Finland, together with Estonia and Ireland, decided to establish a Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Parallel developments had taken place in the sphere of armaments, first formalized with the NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Cooperation) structure in 1994 which aimed at coordinating armaments development, maintenance and procurement. Although success in terms of harmonizing major equipment choices was patchy and the Nordic powers’ degrees of enthusiasm varied, there were some signs of more systematic cooperation e.g. between Finland and Sweden on ground force equipment.

A new series of initiatives began in 2005 with a study by the Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence, later joined by Finland, and producing a report in 2008 that identified 140 separate cooperation possibilities, 40 of them possible to implement at once. A concrete result was the creation in November 2008 of the NORDSUP structure for cooperation in force production and support services, where Iceland and Denmark were

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14 This and the following paragraph are based on Forsberg, op.cit. in note 3 above.

15 ESDP (re-named CSDP since the Lisbon Treaty), a programme launched in 1999-2000 that allowed the EU to carry out military as well as civilian peace missions under its own command, permitted contributions from non-EU-member nations such as Norway. The idea of preparing ‘Battle Groups’ of approx. 1500 personnel that could be deployed at 15 days’ notice to spearhead an EU operation was launched in 2004. Battle Groups were offered by single nations or groups on a voluntary basis. See Gustav Lindström, ‘Enter the EU battlegroups’, EU Institute of Security Sudies Chaillot Paper no. 97 of February 2007, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp097.pdf.

also included. One year later in November 2009, Nordic ministers decreed the merging of NORDCAPS, NORDAC and NORDSUP into a new Nordic Defence Cooperation framework (NORDEFCO), equally involving all five states.\(^{17}\)

Aside from taking a step forward in coordination, this move could be construed as a signal that defence cooperation was to be promoted as matter of high politics, not only driven from ‘bottom up’ or by the experts. NORDEFCO was not to be institutionalized but run as a ‘lean structure’, pivoting on twice-yearly meetings of defence ministers and of chiefs of defence, and using a different lead nation for each major project. Its themes now range from basic military cooperation for instance in the shared use of training grounds, to modern preoccupations such as cyber-security and gender. Cooperation between the air forces in procurement, monitoring and exercising has been a notable and historically unusual example of progress in an operational field linked to the Nordics’ own defence.

\**II.3 Civil security cooperation and the rise of ‘societal security’**

On the civil security side, the NORDRED system for cooperation between national rescue services was created between Norway and Denmark in 1989 and developed to include all five states by 2001. Practical cross-border cooperation was natural along the long land frontier between Norway and Sweden, but also developed in areas like Tornedalen on the Swedish-Finnish frontier, and the Øresund coastal and sea region shared by Sweden and Denmark (now further integrated by a bridge). From the outset it was driven both by the need to prepare for disasters of trans-boundary scale (eg nuclear events), and by the resource-related logic of pooling scarce assets in remote border regions.\(^{18}\) Such motives led to working-level cooperation on many specific aspects including training, exercising, and preparedness for CBRN (chemical, biological, radiation or nuclear) emergencies. The five Nordic police forces also had a long-standing history of cooperation (seen for instance in efforts for mutual support at the time of the Copenhagen Environment Conference), while meetings of the Nordic Ministers of Justice have for long constituted a core formation of the NCM. They now meet annually, in principle to consider ‘legislative affairs’, but in practice have also worked on internal security topics that range from fighting terrorism and cross-border crime to prison management. Other NCM formats include Ministers of Environment, Health and Social Affairs, all of whom might wish to consider certain ‘softer’ aspects of security.\(^{19}\)

During the decade of the 2000s, a number of influences and individual events combined to give civil security hazards growing prominence both within individual

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\(^{17}\) Details at http://www.nordefco.org/


Nordic states and in their cooperation. On the longest perspective one may detect the working-through of shifts of agenda triggered by the end of the Cold War, which moved the focus of everyday military activity towards outside tasks like peace-keeping, but also reduced the immediacy of military threats as such. There was an accompanying philosophical shift (clearest in Sweden and least clear in Finland) away from the Cold War notion of ‘total defence’, where civilian sectors had their place in a military-led war effort, towards an approach where civil risks and their solutions had a self-standing value and were to be handled under strictly civilian control. An early reflection of this was the Danish Defence Agreement of 2004 applying to 2005-9, which called for strengthening both the armed forces’ overseas intervention capacity and their ability to help against terrorist acts or other emergencies, at home as well as abroad. While the Danish agency responsible for coordination in these latter cases came under the Defence Ministry, it was very much civilian-led.

The seriousness of potential threats and risks from the non-military end of the spectrum was meanwhile underlined by life itself. The attacks of 11 September 2001, March 2004 (Madrid) and July 2007 (London) brought terrorism – and its links with crime and smuggling of destructive technologies – to the top of the agenda; but harsh lessons were also taught by a series of international pandemics from SARS through to bird ‘flu; by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which cost the lives of 543 Swedish citizens and many other Nordics; and by other natural disasters serious enough to cause real pain in Nordic economic and social life, such as the winter storm that hit Southern Sweden just after the tsunami. The latter, in particular, triggered a debate over the adequacy of official responses that was eventually to significantly weaken the responsible Swedish government, thereby signalling to all Nordic politicians that the state’s civil protection duties were something not to be taken lightly. Also influential in the political realm was the growing attention to the subject by the Nordic Council, which – among other things - strongly endorsed the recommendations of a 2004 report by retired Danish politician Poul Schlüter, defining the aim of making Norden a truly ‘border-free’ zone and drawing

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21 See http://bbs.dk/eng/Pages/dema.aspx.
22 An independent report of 1 December 2005 (‘Sverige och tsunami – granskning och förslag’, at http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5266/a/54279) strongly criticized the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, leading to the latter’s resignation.
23 The Nordic Council had in fact been calling for improved civil security cooperation since 2001, often making explicit parallels with the progress in military and police-related collaboration. Similar recommendations were made to governments in 2005 and 2008, and have continued up to the present. For an example of arguments used, see the article ‘Utveckla ett modernt nordiskt sakerhetssamarbete’ of May 2009 by Sinikka Bohlin and Jan-Erik Enestam, re-published at http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/articles/utveckla-ett-modernt-nordiskt-sakerhetssamarbete.
attention to the gaps that must be remedied to achieve this. We shall see the ‘border-free’ concept re-surfacing in the language of the Haga declarations, below.25

In a wider perspective, it is worth noting that no Nordic state could rely on outside help to cover the toughest of its non-military threats and risks, in the same way that all Nordics had de facto relied on the US and NATO for ‘hard’ military-strategic protection since World War Two. The US was gradually reducing the level of its physical commitment (eg troop levels) in Europe at this time, giving greater priority to other regional conflicts as well as ‘new threats’ like terrorism and proliferation. The unilateral US military withdrawal from Iceland in 2006 made clear that the Nordic region was not immune from the trend. More to the point, no single protector state - and least of all one a whole ocean away - could step in to solve a local infrastructure disaster, high mortality from a pandemic, or the impact of climate change. In such cases, responsibility began and ended at national government level; and the most natural outside partners were neighbours with whom the state shared its physical environment, features of social design and culture, and economic interconnections.26 Beyond Norden (and as addressed later in this paper), the same logic was starting at this time to promote serious attention to civil security cooperation in the wider EU framework.

At policy and doctrinal level, meanwhile, the 2000s saw a converging trend in Nordic states towards the definition of ‘societal’ or ‘comprehensive’ national security concepts that might co-exist with military-led planning for war-time, but within which the ‘softer’ aspects of security were paramount. As briefly explained above, the ‘societal’ approach defines the protection of society as a whole – with its own complex mechanisms, values, and culture – as its goal, rather than physical boundaries or (as in ‘human security’) the isolated individual. It also recognizes the capacity of non-state actors within society, from businesses through NGOs and social organizations down to individuals, to play a large role themselves in warding against, coping with, and recovering from disasters: a recognition that underlines the value of local ownership and devolution of competence, where practical.27 The appeal of such an approach in post-Cold-War Norden, where it

25 Curiously, the experience gained by the Nordics in peace interventions abroad, and the growing international understanding of the importance of civilian security aspects of peace-building, cannot really be added to this list of influences. While the Nordics often led in developing relevant international/institutional doctrines, they did not necessarily see compelling consequence for their actions at home (vide the continuing Swedish reservations about civil-military role-sharing in emergencies). Regarding purely military cooperation the story is different, as noted above.

26 The argument could be expanded to show how a typical ‘small’ state (a category that includes all the Nordics) has a significantly different pattern of competence vs. vulnerability, and a different set of needs for external interaction, in non-military compared with military dimensions of security. See Clive Archer, Alyson JK Bailes and Anders Wivel, Small States in International Security: Europe and beyond, London: Routledge 2014, esp. chapters 2, 5 and 6.

27 Bailes, op.cit in note 4 above.
became the declared doctrine of Norway and Sweden\textsuperscript{28} and had much the same effect under ‘preparedness’ and ‘comprehensive’ labels in Denmark and Finland respectively, can be seen as both philosophical and practical. In doctrinal terms it signalled a shift away from military focus and leadership, and a ‘democratic’ approach sensitive to society’s own needs and rights. Given the wide range of things that can hurt society, from non-warlike physical violence through to social divisions and weaknesses, it was an ‘umbrella’ under which as many aspects of security/safety as desired could be brought together for coordination. It also reflected the truth that modern Nordic societies were generally robust, capable of self-help and resilience, and that the state could ease the burden of protection through cross-sectoral partnership. All this reasoning can be seen clearly reflected as early as 2006 in the Finnish Government’s Strategy for Protecting the Vital Functions of Society,\textsuperscript{29} which later became the core of a full national security strategy.

The societal concept is not immune to criticism, especially at the theoretical level and in some of its normative implications (who decides what is ‘society’?\textsuperscript{30}). Nordic governments, however, chose to apply it in a way that side-stepped philosophical complications by focusing strongly on exceptional events that clearly threatened all their citizens, and developing systems to avoid, contain, resolve and re-build after such occurrences. The same concentration can be seen in Norway’s SAMRISK research programme,\textsuperscript{31} the first major funding exercise for Nordic societal security research, where a majority of the work done looked at technical and other practical aspects. While it might risk a relative lack of attention to longer-term causation, prophylaxis, and the non-material components of resilience, this reading of the societal agenda undoubtedly made it a better instrument for creating new common ground in Nordic security cooperation. Not only was the range of events of concern broadly similar for all countries, but a new language and a new logic in grouping them for public policy purposes could be shared at least among the four larger Nordics.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, as we shall see below, a clearer

\[\textsuperscript{28} \text{For a working definition see the Norwegian Justice Ministry’s website at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/tema/samfunnsikkerhet-og-beredskap.html?id=87075, which also makes the connection with ‘preparedness’.}
\[\textsuperscript{29} \text{http://www.defmin.fi/files/858/06_12_12_YETTS_in_english.pdf}
\[\textsuperscript{30} \text{More on this in Bailes, op.cit in note 4 above.}
\[\textsuperscript{31} \text{See Sluttrapport SAMRISK 2006-11 (2011) available from the Norwegian Research Council at www.forskningsradet.no.}
\[\textsuperscript{32} \text{Iceland has been relatively slow in developing an explicit national security policy, for reasons including lack of direct military experience and strong internal divisions of opinion (see Alyson JK Bailes and Þröstur F Gylfason, ‘Iceland and “Societal Security”, Stjórnmal og Stjórnssýsla (University of Iceland) June 2008, available at http://www.stjornmalogstjornsysla.is/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=368). However, a risk assessment published in March 2009 by a non-state expert commission used ‘societal’ as a group classifier for threats/risks broadly matching what other Nordics would place under that heading. The term has also been used in a typically Nordic way during work done by the Ministry of the Interior towards a comprehensive civil protection strategy. Most recently, in February 2014, a cross-party group in the Icelandic Parliament (Alþingi) issued recommendations on future security policy that also used the societal term as a classifier of non-military risks – text available at http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/oryggismal/Thjodaroryggsstefna-skjal.pdf.}
conceptualization of threats/risks shared by all Nordic citizens led inexorably to the question whether Nordic boundaries themselves were too narrow: was there not a sense in which all Northern Europe, or all Europe, needed to be mobilized in the same cause? Was there not also a European ‘society’ in some sense that needed protection? Certain Nordic experts were already raising these questions in 2004-6, even before developments on the EU side made them more pressing in practical terms.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} As an example from 2006: Arjen R. Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard, “Protecting the Union: Analyzing an Emerging Policy Space”, Journal of European Integration, 28:5, December, 405-421.
II. ‘HAGA I’ IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING

III.1 A Sign of the Times: The Stoltenberg Report of 2009

In 2008 the Nordic Foreign Ministers invited a distinguished former Foreign Minister of Norway (and former UNHCR), Thorvald Stoltenberg, to prepare an independent report on new openings for Nordic defence and security cooperation. He was assisted by Sverre Jervell, an official who had also been at his side in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council initiative of 1993. In the core field of military defence, the motivations for a study at this particular time were similar to those already outlined above: notably the need to squeeze more value from cooperation and interoperability in applying a shrinking military resource pool, and the lessons about what Nordics could do together – and how the outside world would appreciate this – gained from crisis management deployments abroad. Ideas on combining military, civilian, and diplomatic assets in mutually supporting ways were also welcomed, in a way that was less typical of earlier Nordic thinking at least in some countries. Those, like Sweden, that had moved furthest from ‘total defence’ were now ready (at least) to contemplate new combinations, driven by a distinctly post-Cold War national and regional logic.

Stoltenberg consulted both official advisers and non-official experts before presenting his report to the Ministers and publishing it in February 2009. The document was deliberately concise, sparing in analysis, and focused upon 13 practical recommendations that might be adopted in any combination. These are set out in Table One below, with a grade on the right-hand side that indicates whether they fell in an already well developed, a less developed, or a hitherto unexplored field of Nordic cooperation.

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34 Text is at http://www.mfa.is/media/Frettatilkynning/Nordic_report.pdf
<table>
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<th>nr.</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Short description</th>
<th>Level of former cooperation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Nordic Stabilisation Task Force</td>
<td>A Nordic stabilization task force should be established to intervene in situations abroad that need not only military inputs, but the re-building of state and political processes. The mixed civil-military force should have a military component, a humanitarian component, a state-building component (including police officers, judges, prison officers, election observers) and a development assistance component.</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Nordic cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace</td>
<td>The Nordic countries should take on part of the responsibility for air surveillance and air patrolling over Iceland. Initially, other Nordics could deploy personnel to the Keflavik base and take part in the regular Northern Viking exercises by Iceland’s Allies. Later they could take responsibility for some of the air patrols organised by NATO, within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP).</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Nordic maritime monitoring system</td>
<td>A Nordic system should be established for monitoring and early warning in the Nordic sea areas. The system should in principle be civilian and be designed for tasks such as monitoring marine pollution and civilian traffic, for which existing military surveillance may not be best-suited. The system could have two pillars, “BalticWatch” for the Baltic Sea and “BarentsWatch” for the North Atlantic and High Northern waters.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Maritime response force</td>
<td>Once a Nordic maritime monitoring system is in place, a Nordic maritime response force should be established, using assets from national coast guards and rescue services. It should patrol regularly in the Nordic seas, with major responsibility for search and rescue.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Satellite system for surveillance and communications</td>
<td>By 2020, a Nordic polar orbital satellite system should be established and linked with the Nordic maritime monitoring system. It could provide real-time images of the situation at sea to help in maritime monitoring and crisis management.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Nordic cooperation on Arctic issues</td>
<td>The Nordic countries (all members of the Arctic Council) should develop practical cooperation on Arctic issues eg in the fields of environment, climate change, maritime safety and search and rescue services.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks</td>
<td>A Nordic resource network should be established to defend the Nordic countries against cyber attacks. It should facilitate exchange of experience, coordinate national efforts at prevention and protection, and guide national capacity-building. In the longer term, the resource network could develop systems for joint identification of actual cyber threats.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Disaster response unit</td>
<td>A Nordic disaster response unit should be established for dealing with large-scale disasters and accidents in Norden and abroad. The unit would coordinate Nordic efforts as needed, developing a roster of available equipment and personnel and a network among relevant public and private organisations. It would set up Nordic groups/teams to meet specific needs, for example in the field of advanced search and rescue.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>War crimes investigation unit</td>
<td>A joint investigation unit should be established to coordinate the Nordic countries' investigation of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by persons residing in the Nordic countries.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Cooperation between foreign services</td>
<td>Joint Nordic diplomatic missions should be considered in important countries where no Nordic state is represented yet. Foreign ministries should cooperate in training.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


How does the Stoltenberg report fit in with the present study’s theme? First, it should not be seen as a precursor of, or precondition for, the launch of the Haga process itself. The idea for the first Haga Ministerial meeting was brewing in 2008 well before Stoltenberg’s results were available. Obviously, also, his purely military and diplomatic proposals were not suited to follow-up in a forum like Haga – in fact, coordinating responsibility for debate and consequential action on the report remained with Foreign Ministers. Rather, three specific lines of connection may be traced. First and most obviously, the Stoltenberg exercise reflected a similar range of pressures and experiences to those that also inspired the launch of Haga. Secondly, the ideas and preferences shaping Stoltenberg’s proposals compare quite closely with those we shall see reflected mutatis mutandis in the first Haga conclusions. Thirdly, the Stoltenberg follow-up process included some results that also influenced the environment, technical and political, for the implementation of the Haga concept in 2009-13. These last two points will be further explained here.

The main features of Stoltenberg’s diagnosis that we also find reflected in the story of Haga are three-fold:
- An attempt to make Nordic security cooperation more genuinely an enterprise ‘at Five’. Given Iceland’s lack of armed forces and Denmark’s frequent reluctance to work
militarily in a Nordic or European (as distinct from Atlantic) context, previous strides in ‘hard’ defence cooperation had often been limited in practice to three countries. Haga itself clearly had a better chance from the start of overcoming this as it focused on non-military areas where agendas overlapped more fully and where the systemic background, if far from identical in different nations, was largely compatible. Stoltenberg aimed at similar results by including an admixture of civil and diplomatic proposals and by suggesting joint action around Iceland, most strikingly in the form of contributions by all other four Nordics to airspace monitoring. The timing of this ‘pan-Nordic’ impulse coincided with a new interest in participation at least from Iceland’s side, where the US military withdrawal in 2006 and the traumas of the economic crash had helped to arouse interest in new policy approaches, and where an expert group was launched in 2008 to take the first steps towards a multi-functional security concept for the country.35

- An attempt to develop a more complete and up-to-date shared base, in conceptual and policy terms, for Nordic cooperation across the security spectrum. Stoltenberg did not dwell on philosophical aspects (no exegesis of ‘societal’ theory) but went straight to the point with his proposal for a Nordic ‘solidarity’ declaration.

- A growing focus on common non-military security concerns: at least six of Stoltenberg’s 13 proposals fell within the civil protection/civil emergency management field. Many of them suggested the cooperative use of multi-purpose assets – either of military origin, or improved civil capacities that might also serve defence-related military needs.36

The one focus in Stoltenberg’s work that we do not find so clearly reflected in Haga I is the tendency to extend Nordic cooperation up towards the Arctic region. It would seem that in the first years after 2009, the Nordics chose to work on the corresponding points either nationally (writing their Arctic ‘strategies’37) or in the different, wider collective forum of the Arctic Council (see section V below). However, a clearer focus on common assessment of and response to Arctic risks – pushed also by the Nordic Council - has begun to emerge in the Haga-framed cooperation of national Directors-General since 2012; and Denmark has announced an Arctic focus as one of the themes of its Haga chairmanship in 2015.

As for Stoltenberg’s influence on the Nordic security policy environment from 2009, this was by no means clear at first since his proposals met with varying degrees of enthusiasm from different countries. There was never a chance of the whole package

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35 See note 32 above.
36 Civil-military cooperation has not been such an explicit theme within the Haga process to date, but it is certainly not excluded and could attract further discussion in future.
being implemented at once. However, the Nordic Council gave his approach strong support from the start, led by its Secretary-General Jan-Erik Enestam (a former Defence and Interior Minister), and kept up the pressure on governments to account for their reactions to it: something that must also have encouraged the political efforts leading to Haga I.

In fact, after a couple of years’ discussion, the picture of differential implementation took an unexpected turn. While Stoltenberg’s ideas for joint Nordic ‘teams’ and ‘forces’ languished, the Foreign Ministers felt able already in April 2011 to issue a joint declaration of ‘solidarity’ promising each other mutual help ‘with relevant means’. Tellingly, the declaration did not include traditional military attacks, but it was very much to the point for Haga in focusing on man-made or accidental civil emergencies, and specifically singling out the need for cooperation on cyber-threats. Politically, it built among other things on the national solidarity promise that Sweden had shortly before extended to its neighbours, and which did include military contingencies (see more in next section). This evidence of new flexibility in the Nordic non-allied nations’ stance was confirmed when in 2012, Sweden and Finland began to indicate interest in sending their military aircraft to join in NATO-coordinated air patrolling exercises over Iceland (Stoltenberg proposal no. 2). Despite a difficult political debate in Finland, both nations duly took part in the Iceland Air Meet of February 2014.

III.2 The genesis of ‘Haga’

It was no accident that the first Ministerial meeting of the new Nordic civil security initiative took place in Sweden. National experiences, influences from the EU and NATO, and good progress in bilateral (mainly Swedish-Norwegian) initiatives all seem to have created a ‘head of steam’ among Swedish civil security experts by 2008: a feeling that something must be (and could be) done, even when it was too soon to say exactly what. The contribution of negative experiences has already been noted, since Sweden was so deeply affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami and within days of it, suffered a major natural catastrophe from winter storms in its Southern provinces. These and other traumas led to a major internal sha-

38 Enestam actually held ministerial office in Finland for 12 years including the Social Affairs and Environment portfolios.
40 For the text see http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandskristofa/Norraen-samstoduyfirlysing-ENG.pdf.
ke-up of internal crisis management mechanisms, with the former coordinating agency and rescue services being amalgamated under the name of Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), and a substantial new civil protection unit (allowing 24/7 presence) being created within the Prime Minister’s office. Sweden was in a mood to pair these structural changes with new ideas: ready to seek inspiration and chances for burden-sharing abroad, but also interested in finding ways to show that it was in command of the dossier again and could bring added value to international discussions.

At the same time and as just mentioned, general developments in Swedish strategic thinking were bringing the specific merits of Nordic solidarity and security cooperation into focus on both the military and non-military fronts. After the first decade of EU membership, when the Swedish and Finnish élites naturally enough focused on making the most of their new roles and potential new allies in Brussels, the pendulum in a much-enlarged Union was swinging back towards regional initiatives as the key to both influence and progress. Already in the early 2000s the five Nordic states had realized that a common, positive approach to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy would best suit their interests, opening the way for an eventual joint Nordic Battle Group within the ESDP framework.44 The idea that they should also stand together for their own security needs can be traced in Sweden’s own debate through the evolution of the ‘solidarity’ idea, first broached in the official Defence Report of 200445 which suggested that Sweden was unlikely to stay neutral if another EU state suffered armed attack. After further exchanges between government and parliament, a defence reform Bill enacted on 16 June 200946 – that is, prepared over much the same period as Haga I – stated that ‘Sverige kommer inte att forhålla sig passivt om en katastrof eller ett angrepp skulle drabba ett annat medlemsland eller nordiskt land’ (Sweden will not take a passive stance if another EU Member State or other Nordic country [authors’ italics] suffers a disaster or an attack).

At the time, the shift away from military non-engagement implied by this solidarity pledge drew most attention in Sweden and abroad. But the mention in it of mutual help

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43 Statsrådsberedningens kansli för krishantering, see http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2247/a/54230. The first head and deputy head were drawn from the previous emergency management board and rescue services. At the same period, Finland also created an emergency unit in the PM’s office and Norway a similar centre in the Ministry of Justice.

44 See note 15 above.

45 Försvarsberedningens rapport “Försvar för en ny tid” (Ds 2004:30) www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/02/45/28/e7bca46.pdf.

in ‘disasters’ was no accident, and equally seriously meant. A policy statement of 2007\textsuperscript{47} had already remarked that (in present authors’ translation):

Against the background of the Nordic states’ common approach in many fields, the (Swedish) government believes that Nordic cooperation in the area of crisis preparedness, i.e. Nordic preparedness for crises, should be an object for common political reflections and dialogue . . . (This could cover for instance) policy orientation, exchange of experiences, and practical cooperation in rescue services and crisis readiness, and discussion of deeper or new cooperation on eg CBRN events, protection of functions important for society, and exercise and training activities. . . . Nordic cooperation also offers in many respects a good basis for wider regional cooperation in the Baltic space.

Here we find not just a general theme, but detailed Swedish priorities that were to be reflected in the outcome of Haga I two years later.

Other factors helping to explain the exact timing of Sweden’s move included advance planning on aims for the Swedish EU Presidency in June-December 2009, where it was decided to include efforts for progress in civil emergency cooperation – again with a focus on CBRN contingencies.\textsuperscript{48} Brussels came into the picture, however, in another way as the place where Nordic officials concerned with civil protection had recently begun to meet regularly, back to back with European events, to exchange views on relevant EU and NATO developments. One such meeting in 2008, where Icelandic and Finnish experts happened to be present (as they were not always), gave a general welcome to the idea of a Swedish initiative; and between then and Spring 2009 the Danes helped in preparing a discussion paper for the high-level meeting. Personal factors were important in this breakthrough, notably the leadership of Swedish Defence Ministry official Olle Jonsson,\textsuperscript{49} but also the good relations already developed with key figures notably in Oslo and Copenhagen. Iceland’s coincidental eagerness for a forum where it could explore its new security awareness and make a distinct input has already been mentioned. Some of our informants also suggested a special motive for Norway: the value of inside knowledge from, and cooperation with, the three Nordic EU members in keeping up to date with civil security-relevant developments in the Union.

If the head of steam had its source at official/expert level, it clearly had no trouble bringing Sweden’s Minister – Sten Tolgfors - on board. This was perhaps no surprise as he had been profiled as a reforming minister, also overseeing the major NORDEFCO military initiative and the renewal of Sweden’s commitment to lead a Battle Group for the EU’s security and defence policy. He already had a good rapport on civil security matters with his Norwegian counterpart. For him and other politicians involved, the Haga idea opened up a new area of initiative that was neither dependent on the military, nor overtly linked with the controversial topic of NATO. It could bring synergy with EU work without having to frame it in terms of EU demands - not always a popular

\textsuperscript{47} Regeringens proposition 2007/08:92 Stärkt krisberedskap – för säkerhets skull (pp. 9-10).

\textsuperscript{48} See the Swedish Presidency programme at http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/12/88/73/9fc3303c.pdf, pp. 24-5.

\textsuperscript{49} Jonsson had also picked up ideas during an earlier posting at NATO HQ.
discourse in Euro-sceptical Sweden and Denmark. It held out both security benefits and the chance of efficiency savings for the ordinary Nordic citizen. These political attractions make it even more puzzling why Haga activities were not more actively publicized for political benefit at the time (or since). We shall re-visit the question in our final conclusions.

III.3 Haga I:
The meeting and results

The first high-level meeting of the five ministries responsible for civil protection and emergency management was duly held in Haga Palace just outside Stockholm on 27 April 2009, with Swedish Defence Minister Sten Tolgfors in the chair. As shown in Table Two, the Ministries concerned were those of Defence in Denmark and Sweden, the Interior in Finland and Iceland, and Justice (from 2011, Justice and Public Security) in Norway. On this first occasion, Finland and Iceland were represented not by full ministers but by a State Secretary and a senior diplomat respectively. Nonetheless, the clear message emerging in the Haga I declaration (Annex I below) was that the civil protection/emergency management agenda had been raised for the first time to the highest political level, and that these five Ministries intended to work as a team driving Nordic cooperation forward in a field where bottom-up, disaggregated actions had so far dominated. They originally planned to continue meeting as often as twice a year, but after the second (Oslo) meeting in December 2009 this was amended to an annual ministerial event. Follow-up work continued in the interim both in a Haga-dedicated group of officials from each ministry, and among the five Directors-General of the relevant implementing agencies (who had been meeting jointly for some time with an initial focus on fire-fighting and rescue).

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50 The Haga I text was extensively redrafted in the margins of the meeting to enhance the level of ambition, mainly at Norwegian and Swedish insistence. Some non-Swedish spellings crept in during the process.
### Table Two: National ministries and agencies engaged in the Haga process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ministry / Agency</th>
<th>Haga information page (if any)</th>
<th>Central agency (local name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence, <a href="http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Pages/Frontpage.aspx">www.fmn.dk/eng/Pages/Frontpage.aspx</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/Nordicemergencymanagementcooperation.aspx">www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/Nordicemergencymanagementcooperation.aspx</a></td>
<td>Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) Beredskapstyrelsen (BRS) <a href="http://brs.dk/eng/Pages/dema.aspx">http://brs.dk/eng/Pages/dema.aspx</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence <a href="http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2060">www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2060</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12906">www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12906</a></td>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency** Myndighet för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) <a href="http://www.msb.se/en">https://www.msb.se/en</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exceptionally, Iceland’s place in the Directors-General group for civil emergency cooperation has been taken (up to 2014) by the Director of Mannvirkjastofnun (www.Mannvirkjastofnun.is), the Icelandic Construction Agency, which has responsibilities for physical safety including in Iceland’s offshore oil/gas exploration zone (Dragon field).

* There is also a crisis management unit within the Swedish Prime Minister’s office: [http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2247/a/54230](http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2247/a/54230)

As to the substance of the new cooperation plans, it is interesting that the Haga I text uses several overlapping expressions for the agreed field of action: ‘krisberedskap’ (lit. crisis readiness), ‘samhällsskydd och beredskap’ (societal protection and readiness), or ‘civil krisberedskap och räddningstjänst’ (civil emergency readiness and rescue services). The same flexibility in terms has persisted through later Haga documents, doubtless aiming to accommodate the different official terminology used from country to country and from case to case. In practice, however, all specific issues addressed from 2009 to the present have fallen within the realm of ‘societal security’ (in its operational Nordic definition); and by the time of Haga II, ‘societal security’ itself - ‘samhällssäkerhet’ in Swedish - had become the most common denominating term in Haga texts. This points at the same time to the originality and gap-filling nature of the Haga cooperation, and to a challenge of definition: what makes
an issue a ‘Haga’ one? The de facto answer is, a sub-field of event-focussed societal security that lies within the (varying) competence patterns of all five ministries. But this gives no guide as to priorities and linkages within the potentially very wide field opened up. In Haga’s first four years, it is indeed quite hard to see an overarching logic in the subjects picked out for action - unless as a combination of national ‘favourites’ and avenues of least resistance. Only in the new approach of Haga II, as we shall see, was an attempt made to derive logical priorities from a full audit of needs and existing provisions.

Table Three: Haga topics
and corresponding working groups, 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Tactical fire prevention (DK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pre-deployment of selected capacities</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>Strategic air transportation to emergency areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Medical evacuation with aircraft</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>Need for a more ambitious Haga declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Nordic cooperation inventory</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Pre-deployment of selected capacities</td>
<td>Vaxholm – Stockholm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The issues singled out for joint Nordic attention in 2009-13 are shown in Table Three, together with the country that volunteered to act as lead nation for each. The idea of burden-sharing is clearly present in the spread of responsibilities, as well as in the decision to rotate the Ministerial leadership of the process (Norway second half of 2009, Denmark 2010, Finland 2011, Iceland 2012, Sweden again in 2013 and Norway in 2014). However it is noteworthy that Finland and Iceland did not ‘lead’ on any of the first three years’ themes, and they seem to have found it hard at times to field experts for all the ongoing groups.51 As to the

51 Iceland has taken on some special aspects at expert level, eg looking at long-distance operations and cold-water
topics added from December 2009 onwards, we may note a tendency to focus them on crisis response (the conceptual field of ‘rescue’) rather than broader issues of preparedness and system design. The December 2009 topic ‘Pre-deployment of selected facilities’ is a cryptic reference to the developing habit of Nordic states’ sending reinforcements to each other to deal with expected public order problems, such as riots at the Copenhagen environment conference. The new topic in 2010 involved an audit of strategic and tactical air transport facilities and assets for fighting forest fires, and the decision in 2011 to focus on possible coordination of MEDEVAC capacities flowed from its findings. Ministers at Helsinki also suggested a joint Nordic ‘fire alarm’ day. At Reykjavik in 2012, the focus switched to working for a new step forward with the planned Haga II declaration.
IV. HAGA FROM 2009 TO 2014

IV.1 Progress and its limits

There can be no question that Nordic cooperation in civil protection and societal security moved forward after the impulse of Haga I: the activities shown in the last table are witness enough to that. It is important to recall, however, that the Haga process itself was only one of several driving factors and sources of relevant lessons during these years. We have already seen the relevance of progressive implementation of Stoltenberg’s Nordic Cooperation proposals. Underlining the separate dynamics of the latter, the Nordic Foreign Ministers’ adoption of a ‘soft’ security solidarity declaration in April 2011 came as a surprise to civil protection experts from the five countries who were attending a joint high-level course and retreat (including training exercises) in Sweden that same day.\(^52\) The Swedish event was itself the fruit of a Stoltenberg suggestion, giving relevant officials the chance to interact in a more informal group, and to exchange ideas with academics. It was to become a yearly event with Finland and then Norway taking over as host, to be followed by Denmark in 2015.

Progress also continued in several sectoral fields that were not (yet) highlighted in the Haga process, including cyber-security where a General Security Agreement on the exchange and protection of classified data between Nordic states was signed in 2010, and a MoU on cooperation among national CERT (computer emergency response teams) in 2013.\(^53\) Meanwhile ‘life itself’ continued to deliver lessons both about the seriousness

\(^{52}\) This was observed by one of the co-authors, who happened to be present at the event.

\(^{53}\) Details on this, and other sectoral examples, are in the last section of the HNS report presented to the Haga Ministers’ Oslo meeting (section IV.2 below).
of non-military security challenges in the North, and the shortcomings in capacity and procedures to deal with them. All Nordic states were affected by the latest ‘flu pandemic, and not only Norway but its neighbours were deeply shaken by the Breivik incident in 2011. The economic hardships continuing after the crash of 2008, even if not as extreme in the larger Nordic states as elsewhere, lent force to the argument about collaboration as a road to cost-effectiveness. A final driver that was especially strong for Sweden and Finland was the new surge in EU policy-making and action on civil protection and emergency response after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in December 2009, as discussed in section V below.

Against this background, when asked what specifically had been achieved by the series of Haga meetings, the practitioners we interviewed mainly cited the general boost and high-level support given to their cooperation, and the increased opportunities to meet and know each other better. Rather few concrete breakthroughs were mentioned, including a new Search & Rescue network set up under a Norwegian lead in 2010 to cooperate on sea rescue tasks, and a connected ‘Skagex’ exercise (involving a shipboard explosion). Iceland cited useful new contacts between the five countries’ rescue training institutions. The concerned nations (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) found value in an EU-funded ‘Cross Border’ research and dialogue project that directly complemented the Haga programme and whose findings were to influence Haga II. One official pointed to the effect of the new contacts and meetings in promoting a typically Nordic ‘soft coordination’: one could go home and argue for progress on the grounds that ‘Country X is already doing such and such…’

Practitioner testimony also, however, highlights some limitations and frustrations of the first few years’ experience, without which the impetus for Haga II might be harder to understand. The chosen approach, singling out a set of discrete issues within existing cooperation, made for a quick start but also had its drawbacks. One was the lack of an overall concept or guide to priorities – ‘we were not building a house’, as one informant put it. This also made it hard to draw out and discuss some of the larger, generic difficulties running through all Nordic security-related cooperation; to frame generic solutions that might be useful for all; to see clearly the possible gaps and overlaps in existing activity; or to identify completely new cases for Nordic action. Instead, the spotlight shone on one existing field of work, led to conclusions on a possible upgrade (or no need for it), and then moved on elsewhere. When NORDRED experts were asked if NORDRED needed updating, and said No – for example - that seems to have ended the conversation on that particular point. More generally, participants in the Haga process seem to have

54 Training abroad is vital for Iceland, 25 of whose experts attended Nordic courses abroad in 2002-7 alone.
55 See https://www.msb.se/eucrossborder. Financing came from the EU’s Civil Protection Instrument.
56 The most detailed account of Haga-related progress in the focus areas is in section 3 of the ‘samverkansanalys’ presented to Haga Ministers at Oslo in 2014 – section IV. 2 below.
been either unclear or divided on whether it was meant to be a time-limited ‘project’ or ‘campaign’, or a permanent ‘process’ or ‘forum’ analogous to the recent development of ‘hard’ defence cooperation.

Structural features of the Haga approach may have compounded these difficulties. Despite the complexity of the programme, there was never any thought of setting up a central office or secretariat; and this was clearly not just a matter of saving resources.\(^{57}\) The method of multi-centric, voluntary networking was felt to be natural and appropriate for Norden: it reflected the interpretation of Haga – strongly held by many concerned – as something designed to add to and optimize existing relationships, not to supplant or complicate them. Some officials also felt a secretariat would only be appropriate if large common funds were to be managed. Not having one, however, had consequences that were equally clear to all: notably, a lack of support for the smaller and more remote players (in this case Iceland, and to some degree Finland), less assurance of consistency and coherence from year to year, and perhaps also an impediment to a proactive public affairs strategy.\(^{58}\)

In effect, as a result, implementation lay in the hands of four sets of Nordic analogues - the Haga Ministers, the high officials representing their ministries, the existing group of five agency Directors-General, and experts attending the single-issue working groups who often came from agencies too. Despite general good will, these levels sometime seem to have operated in an inter-blocking rather than inter-locking way. Top-level Haga ideas landed on the desks of sometimes quite specialized officials who found it hard to see their added value. The Directors-General of agencies, who already had their own joint objectives to work on and their own national headaches with restructuring, funding, etc, sometimes felt that Ministers were intervening in issues too trivial for them. An oft-cited example was the idea of having a single Nordic day for testing domestic smoke alarms. Another 'bright idea' that ran into the sand was having a single Nordic portal for civil emergency information – though some officials said they gained new insights from discussing it.

The ‘operators’ were thus tempted to see Haga mandates, at best, as an extra burden alongside their core duties, and at worst, as political interference in areas that were already functioning well. Meanwhile the ministerial officials were under pressure to keep coming up with new ideas so that each nation could claim concrete progress at the high-level meeting(s) it hosted. Many informants noted a dropping-off in Ministers’ own level of interest, reflected in the fact that more and more states were represented at

\(^{57}\) A resource-efficient solution would have been to use the resources of the NCM secretariat in Copenhagen, but this would have implied too much formalization and too great an overview for the Nordic Council.

\(^{58}\) Ironically, it was the 5 Nordic states that were simultaneously pressing for the Arctic Council to create its first-ever secretariat (opened in 2013), and one of their main arguments was the need for better public information.
successive Ministerials by State Secretaries or officials – and that the participants tended to ‘just read out their briefs’. Other, more generic problems of Nordic Cooperation that showed themselves also in the Haga context will be left for section VI: but there is already enough here to explain why the need for a second ‘push’ was felt even as early as 2012.

IV.2 Haga II and Oslo

The Haga II meeting was actually held not in Haga Park but at the historic coastal fortress of Vaxholm (home town and constituency of Swedish Defence Minister Karin Enström) a little further outside Stockholm, on 4 June 2013. Ironically, since it was meant to re-ignite the sense of high political direction, no nation except Sweden was represented by a Minister. However, the decisions taken did break important new ground and reflected lessons learned from the strengths and weaknesses of implementation thus far. In conceptual and policy terms, the language of the new declaration used ‘societal security’ as the overarching goal and explicitly integrated the 2011 Nordic solidarity commitment, so that the associated work programme could be presented as helping to create practical conditions for the latter. The mandate for officials’ work in the following year reverted to the logic of building an overall strategic development plan for Nordic civil security cooperation. Instead of listing new sectoral or operational themes, it called for two new cross-cutting studies:

- an across-the-board audit of relevant cooperation (‘samverkansanalys’, also described as ‘phase one’ of a strategic plan), which should identify strategic priorities and areas for development;
- a study of the necessary conditions for, or obstacles to, intra-Nordic Host Nation Support: that is, measures to allow one country’s personnel to work and assets to be used on the territory of another Nordic state as necessary for crisis management purposes.

The drafting groups were to be led by Norway and Sweden respectively, and the results were to be ready for the next Ministerial meeting at Oslo in May 2014.

The difference from Haga I in this approach is worth stressing. Instead of taking a series of unrelated focus topics, the ‘samverkansanalys’ was designed to draw a comprehensive picture that would allow a more logical and cost-effective identification of priorities. It could also be seen as a new attempt to unify the bottom-up and top-down approaches: the operators would report on their working realities, while Ministers would gain a more joined-up picture of expert activities than ever before, and would have a sounder basis for their political guidance. Meanwhile the Host Nation Support study, to a greater degree than any other topic tackled in Haga so far, would confront some of the very basic legal and structural differences in Nordic national systems and explore the options for either overcoming such technical obstacles or working around them. Its value could be equally

59 Perhaps not surprisingly since all Ministerial conclusions after Haga I were fully pre-drafted.
appreciated by larger Nordic states who might be asked to send their experts abroad, and those who anticipated having to ask for such help.

Both studies were duly delivered in time for the Oslo Ministerial on 27 May 2014 – where three nations were represented by Ministers – and they make very interesting reading. The summary of their proposals attached here as Annex Five gives some of the flavour of their frank and open style of drafting, where varying positions of different states are described rather than forced into conformity, and obstacles and uncertainties are freely admitted. They give a sense of the highly complex and varied picture in different fields of cooperation: their legalized or ad hoc nature, the shifting pattern of Nordic involvement and leadership (although a Norwegian-Swedish pair often recurs), and nations’ varying views on priorities and methods – which are not always consistent from field to field. Something that they bring into the open much more clearly than earlier Haga papers is the role played by the EU, not just in stimulating Nordic action through its own initiatives and demands (on which more in Section V), but as a facilitator and provider of cash. In almost every field discussed there are suggestions for seeking funding from relevant EU sources, and it is often clear that no EU money will mean no Nordic initiative (as happened in one existing case when the Commission turned down an application).

If asking how far the reports’ drafters met the Haga II mandate, the answer would be: very well, in literal terms. However, what neither document offers is a complete ‘tour d’horizon’ – the ‘samverkansanalys’ looks only at areas already taken up for attention in the Haga context – nor a root-and-branch examination of the logic, nature and prospects of the Haga process itself. The Norwegian drafters of the ‘samverkansanalys’ do provide a diagram purporting to show how different detailed topics in Haga have served five facets of societal security: prevention, intervention, reconstruction, robust systems and robust citizens, but this has the ring of rationalization after the event. They do not comment on whether these were the right fields or whether completely new ones could be found. Equally, when they formulate the goals of Haga as a border-free Norden with lowered vulnerability, stronger common responses, greater cost-effectiveness and greater Nordic impact in Europe and the world, these principles remain too general to provide a clear guide on where to go next. How the two reports aim to answer that question is, rather, through their respective lists of ‘action areas’ (here summarized at Annex Five).

The Oslo Ministerial meeting of 27 May 2014 naturally welcomed the reports and seems to have based its discussion on their action proposals. The final declaration states that the

60 These unclassified texts are not (yet) published but were available to the co-authors.
61 This gap is to some extent filled by short summaries of other Nordic arrangements in an annex to the HNS report.
62 They are in fact lifted directly from the Haga II declaration.
five nations will go ahead with the idea (top proposal in the ‘samverkansanalys’) of offering one or more multi-national ‘modules’ for civil emergency response to be included in the EU’s ongoing scheme for enhancing civil protection capacities.\textsuperscript{63} It is not specified which, if any, of the three tasks suggested in the report (‘cold conditions’, CBRN, or MEDEVAC) the module(s) should be based on, but the aim is that they should be equally available for EU tasks, humanitarian actions further abroad, or crises within Norden. Further, joint Nordic exercises will be held to test the module(s), and or Host Nation Support (HNS) arrangements, as necessary. The part of the ‘samverkansanalys’ that the declaration does not specifically pick up concerns research cooperation, where some nations may have felt there was already enough happening (see below).

On HNS, the declaration equally does not mention the report’s detailed recommendations but opens the way for further joint work to develop them. The press release links this with improving the conditions for realization of the 2011 solidarity declaration. The ideas on the table in this connection include a five-nation HNS contact group, interoperable communications, coordinated entry/exit points, and the ambitious notion of a larger legal framework to facilitate exchanges of personnel and assets in situations beyond the bounds of the NORDRED agreement. National officials are asked to report the progress made on all the Oslo mandates by Spring 2015, and (significantly) to ‘coordinate action vis-à-vis the European Commission’.

Perhaps most important in the context of Haga’s overall evolution is the mandate given or, rather, confirmed at Oslo to continue work on a common ‘development plan’ and ‘action plan’ for Haga cooperation, which should be presented at the Danish Ministerial in 2015. This can be interpreted as a re-statement of the phase that was always intended to follow the cooperation audit (phase one) enshrined in the ‘samverkansanalys’. How far the Haga process and the decisions made to date will allow such ambitious targets to be met in a year’s time seems an open question. The two reports do provide a much sounder basis than before for priority-setting, and also for seeing the linkages between topics – vide the treatment of exercises. As already argued, however, they cannot be said to supply a full, \textit{a priori} reasoning on what cooperation is truly most needed and efficient in a Nordic framework (compared with the other available sets of partners and institutions), nor of the deepest underlying hindrances and how they might be overcome. The decision to go ahead with the idea of Nordic civil emergency response modules, for all its evident public and political attractions, will create its own work-burdens and open up delicate issues, not necessarily welcome to all officials involved. Other practitioners see risks that localized difficulties with the various practical ideas to be explored following the

\textsuperscript{63} The EU has been working throughout the 2000s on collective rapid reaction capabilities for civil disasters, and the idea of using pre-defined ‘modules’ - analogous to military Battle Groups - was first raised in 2004. Guidelines for implementing it were laid down by the European Commission in 2008 and 2010 and a module exercising programme now also exists: see http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/modules_en.ht.
‘samverkansanalys’ could obscure the importance of and potential for developing the Haga vision in general.

Hopes of maintaining the broader coherence and vigour of the process, however, do not necessarily depend just on Haga itself. Just as Stoltenberg-related and other independent advances helped encourage the process in its early years, one might see signs of a phase of more joined-up reflection on Nordic security cooperation developing in wider fields than Haga in 2013-5. Particularly interesting is the intensification of ‘soft’ security research cooperation, a topic also discussed in the Haga framework since 2009. Four Nordic countries - but not Denmark - have agreed to run a joint research programme into societal security, based on the 2013 report of a task force headed by Professor Bengt Sundelius of Sweden and complementing similar national programmes (eg in Finland).64 Properly handled, the value of the results could be enhanced by synergy with the SAMRISK 2 national programme launched by Norway, and the EU’s major HORIZON 2020 programme65 for which many Nordic groups are putting forward societal security-related proposals. Meanwhile, the group of five Nordic Directors-General for civil security agreed at their June 2013 meeting to establish working groups on regional risk mapping and on strategic foresight – aspects that are crucial for placing joint actions in a coherent context, as recognized by references to them in the ‘samverkansanalys’. Their 2014 meeting moved further on these points and appointed a new expert group on research and dissemination. If, as one must hope, the officials steering the Haga process are aware of these other Nordic reappraisals and make use of their findings, the process is surely flexible enough to accommodate new lessons along the way - just as it did when facing up to the need for Haga II.

**V. Civil Security Cooperation in Wider Frameworks**

Civil and societal emergencies include some very localized events, hardly needing even cross-border cooperation, but also many that are transnational or even global in their source and/or impact. Cooperation in this sphere is thus an issue demanding attention not just among close neighbours like the Nordic states, but also across wider regions and continents and on some topics - such as the consequences of climate change, or pandemic control – at world level. The Nordic states find themselves involved in such discussions and cooperation efforts both as a result of their pattern of institutional membership, and as a function of their

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traditional global activism, including external humanitarian aid and the security dimensions of development assistance.

The question of how the Haga cooperation relates to these other frameworks does not seem to have been much discussed so far within the Haga process itself, and will naturally have been addressed mostly at the level of the national governments and ministries when they seek to coordinate, and find synergies within, their different levels of external commitment. One should not jump to the conclusion that more formal links between the various processes and forums are needed, since each has its own rationale and political dynamics, and any improvement in national capacities and mutual awareness will bring benefits in all connections. However, it may be useful here to look briefly at three of the more obvious wider settings where all five Nordic states (and sometimes their autonomous territories) are engaged, to see how much overlap actually exists with Haga’s aims, and whether interconnections between the processes are already becoming or may become significant in future.66

V.1 The European Union

Although only Denmark,67 Finland and Sweden out of the Nordic group are members of the EU, Iceland and Norway since 1994 have been members of the European Economic Area68 which gives them full access to the Single Market, and to a range of EU functional policies and mechanisms closely linked with it. Among these are the EU system of assistance for civil emergency handling, which dates back to the 1980s and includes a so-called ‘Community mechanism’ that can be invoked to steer funds and in-kind help to countries suffering such events.69 Nordic attitudes to this system were for long somewhat reserved, combining a preference for self-sufficiency in their own crises with uneasiness about transferring resources to partners who might have caused some of their own problems through carelessness. Thus, the pattern of activations of the Community mechanism was strongly tilted in its first decades towards events in the EU’s Southern Member States and later, Central and South-east European ones.70 Up to 2012, Sweden and Norway activated the mechanism once each and

66 The main frameworks not explored here are those of UN-related work (eg with agencies like the World Health Organization, and the global management of climate change); NATO’s role in civil emergency planning (on which see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49158.htm?), and relevant issues within external assistance policy, including Nordic cooperation in civilian peace missions and disaster assistance - which was strengthened for example in the Haiti case, 2010. Our informants saw this last area as unproblematic, compared with Haga proper.

67 The Faroe Islands and Greenland have opted out of Danish membership and have limited, sui generis bilateral relations with Brussels.

68 See http://www.efta.int/eea.

69 See http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm. The same mechanism is used to organize EU assistance for emergencies abroad.

70 For a list of activations of the mechanism in 2007-12, see http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/disaster_response/EUCPM_activations_since_01012007.pdf
Iceland four times in relation to volcanic events and earthquakes, but in most cases the EU involvement was limited to early warning, information exchange and monitoring. Since the late 2000s, however, Nordic-European interplay in this field has become more active and productive as the EU itself has given greater policy prominence to civil emergency handling, and in so doing has shown itself amenable to Nordic influences. The connection in timing and motives between Sweden’s plans to highlight civil protection in its 2009 EU Presidency, and the genesis of the Haga process, has already been noted above. At the same period nations were going through the process of ratifying the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, eventually brought into force on 1 December 2009. This Treaty for the first time contained a section on Civil Protection (Article 196) and, even more strikingly, a new Article 222 making it an absolute obligation for Member States to help with all the means at their disposal in the event of a major terrorist attack or natural catastrophe on their partners’ territory. The similarity in timing, policy background and content between this Europe-wide ‘solidarity clause’, the unilateral solidarity pledge given by Sweden to its neighbours in June 2009, and the Nordic solidarity declaration of 2011 referred to above was clearly no accident. Sweden’s statement could be seen inter alia as a national preparation for assuming the new Lisbon obligations, while the Nordic statement of 2011 ensured that Norden’s three EU members would not be less committed to help Iceland and Norway than they were now towards other EU states, including some very faraway ones.

Lisbon’s Article 222 also called for cooperation in analyzing and preventing such risks and gave the EU’s central organs a role in related preparations; a process that is still ongoing both in the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), not least in connection with elaborating, testing and using the ‘modules’ programme mentioned above. As we have seen in the Nordic case, the Commission may also provide funding for advances in regional cooperation and capacity-building. Meanwhile, in 2010 the EU adopted its first Internal Security Strategy with the goal of combating all ‘major threats which have a direct impact on the lives, safety and wellbeing of citizens’ – a definition that was intended to include terrorism and crime but also all kinds of civil emergencies and (a growing focus of EU discussion and activism) cyber-attacks. During 2013 the states participating in EU R&D programmes, which include Norway and Iceland, completed

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71 A change of heart on this particular point is suggested by Sweden’s decision in August 2014 to activate the Community mechanism for a forest fire in Västmanland, where Italy and France provided aircraft to combat the blaze by ‘water-bombing’.


73 This presupposes that those concerned actually ask for help. However, in legal terms the text creates a far clearer and stronger obligation for Member States (and also the EU organs) than does Article 42.7 of the same Treaty dealing with a common response to military attacks. For a full analysis see Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard, The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective Tool?, Swedish Institute of International Affairs October 2010, available at http://www.ui.se/upl/files/44241.pdf.

negotiations on a ‘Horizon 2020’ security research funding programme75 which for the first time grounds itself conceptually in the notion of ‘societal security’, and includes a strong focus on preparedness and resilience in civil emergencies. While rather few of the Horizon 2020 research themes are suited to a social sciences approach, they do – as noted above - offer considerable overlap and potential synergy with the Nordic programme for new cooperative societal security research. Nordic applicants from the hi-tech and consultancy sectors may also stand a competitive chance in the more technology-related parts of Horizon 2020. The first call for funding proposals fell due in August 2014.

The most obvious ways to view the interplay of Nordic and Europe-wide collaboration in this field are positive. Just as with Nordic ‘hard’ defence cooperation, it can be argued that refining and rationalizing any region’s capacities allows that region to make a more valuable contribution to European-level tasks as necessary. The latest (Oslo, May 2014) decision to try to develop a Nordic civil emergency response module or modules for the EU pool is a particularly clear example, aiming to repeat the model of the Nordic Battle Group in ESDP/CSDP. Conversely, in areas of civil threat and risk where the Nordics lack long-term experience, such as terrorism and large-scale international crime, they should be able to benefit by drawing on other European regions’ knowledge and on Europe-level regulatory and technological solutions. The risk that intra-Nordic regulations and pan-European ones might diverge and confront the nations with double standards is slim, given that all five Nordics apply the rules of the Single Market, and also that the Haga cooperation generally eschews legislative approaches. Indeed, the more typical sequence (as seen currently in the field of Host Nation Support) is for the Nordic EU members to seek to extend an EU regulation/standardization initiative across the whole Nordic group, aiming to avoid new intra-Nordic dividing lines as much as to reap the corresponding regional benefits. In such cases – which recall the entry of Norway and Iceland into Schengen as a means inter alia to preserve the Nordic Passport Union – the five states will end up cooperating more formally and deeply than they might ever have done under the impetus of intra-Nordic cooperation alone.76 Last and not least, as noted in section IV.2 and again above, the availability of EU finance for studies, exercises and capacity building has become an important spur for Nordic progress and in some fields seems even a necessary condition for it.

If any aspect of the Nordic/EU relationship is more ambivalent, therefore, it may rather be the question of how far the Haga process is or may become a ‘model’ for other Europeans. It has recently been argued that Nordic defence cooperation sets an example worth consideration through the very modesty and pragmatism of its aims: it focuses on


76 Cf Malena Britz (note 18 above), pp 257-9.
the achievable and a step-by-step approach, rather than any grand goal such as a perfect security union. This is true, as we have seen, of the Haga process too; and the same qualities might make the latter a useful example both for parts of Europe where national traditions are not easily compatible, and for Europe as a whole when tackling some especially sensitive sphere of governance.

However, there are pairs of nations and parts of Europe where civil security cooperation has already reached more fully integrated levels (eg, British-Irish anti-terrorist cooperation or flood control on the Danube), and where participants might feel they have lessons to share with Norden rather than vice versa. One of our Haga informants noted that Denmark already felt it had a ‘border-free’ civil security relationship with Germany. There are always two general ways to view Nordic-type ‘soft’ integration: as a sensible pis aller and stepping stone to ‘the real thing’, or as an over-comfortable compromise that ultimately gets in the way of the latter. Finally, the southern nations who have thus far most often sought EU disaster assistance, and who stand to face the earliest major damage from climate change, might wonder whether closer Nordic cooperation focused on specifically Nordic (cold-weather, Arctic) needs will mean fewer Nordic capacities that are sufficiently multi-purpose to help other European regions, and less Nordic willingness and energy for deploying them away from home. The focus(es) chosen for an eventual Nordic civil emergency response module will be watched with interest in this connection.

77 Hanna Ojanen, op.cit. in note 3 above
V.2 Wider Regional Cooperation: the Baltic and Barents frameworks

When the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union opened new spaces for possible East-West cooperation in Europe, the Nordic states Denmark and Norway were among the first to inspire the creation of new ‘sub-regional’ systems drawing the Russian Federation into partnership: resulting in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) inaugurated in 1992, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and Barents Regional Council (BRC) founded in 1993, respectively. From the start, these groupings had both an underlying strategic intent – to buttress regional stability through improved understanding and the creation of common interests – and a number of civil or societal security topics on their overt agenda. Both groups discussed such issues as border management, combating pollution (including problems of nuclear contamination and waste), combating smuggling and trafficking, and the response to major accidents and other civil emergencies. The CBSS in particular had a wealth of subordinate groups and committees specializing in such topics, while in the Barents system the BRC allowed local (provincial/county) authorities to work directly together with input from local indigenous peoples’ groups. In both settings, modest funds were available for collaborative projects, whereby in practice resources of Nordic or EU origin were most commonly channelled into border improvements and safety or pollution ‘hotspots’ on the Russian side.

The original dynamics of both groups could not help but be affected when first Sweden and Finland in 1995, then the Baltic States and Poland in 2004, joined the EU. Although the groups’ members worked together, and sometimes lobbied together in Brussels, to soften the new dividing lines implied notably by Schengen membership, the long-term effect has been to push the CBSS towards less of a political and more of a project-making role. In that capacity it is rivalled by the EU’s own Northern Dimension (ND) project developed in the late 1990s, formalized under the Finnish EU Presidency in 1999 and revised in 2006, which includes Norway and Iceland and provides substantial funds for cross-border projects involving Russia – also in the High North. In 2009 the EU adopted its own Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in which the priorities included such civil security topics as climate change mitigation, energy supplies, maritime safety and combating organized crime. There has been discussion over whether some or all of

80 Background and text at http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/.
the sub-regional schemes should now be amalgamated, but thus far the consensus is only to improve coordination (particularly of project plans).\textsuperscript{81} 

The general urge to strengthen cooperation on civil protection and emergency response has been reflected in recent proceedings of the sub-regional groupings as well. Barents Rescue exercises focusing on natural disasters and large accidents have been held biannually in Norway, Sweden and Finland since 2001, with a view to effective joint response to natural disasters and accidents, and with increasingly active Russian participation.\textsuperscript{82} In 2008 an intergovernmental agreement on emergency prevention, preparedness and response was signed. The BEAC’s 20th anniversary declaration at Kirkenes in 2013 also supported initiatives to improve nuclear emergency response measures. There have however been some limits to cooperation notably in the handling of military accidents, where Russia has been reluctant even to share information.

The CBSS for its part has had a strong focus on maritime security ever since the sinking of the ‘Estonia’ ferry in 1994, reinforced by concerns about the environmental impact of marine accidents. Another early priority was the prevention of and reaction to nuclear incidents, on which CBSS members signed an unprecedented legally binding agreement on Exchange of Radiation Monitoring in 1994. A CBSS expert group on nuclear and radiation safety continues to work on cooperative monitoring and training. The CBSS further has task forces and sub-groups working on organized crime, tax crime, border control, and general civil protection (based on networking between national rescue services). ‘Softer’ issues of societal security such as human trafficking and children’s protection have also been addressed, but attempts by Russia to make anti-terrorist cooperation a major theme have been met with reserve by Western participants.\textsuperscript{83}

Following the 2009 Stoltenberg Report and when it was seen to be producing concrete results, the question was raised – by the Nordic ministers among others - whether ‘soft’ security cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic States should similarly be reviewed and enhanced. Ever since the latter regained their de facto freedom, a close security relationship has developed in which the Nordics have made clear they cannot alone guarantee the Baltics’ territorial defence, but have provided many kinds of military aid, advice, and organizational support - aimed not least at guiding all three Baltic States into NATO as early as possible.\textsuperscript{84} Economic and commercial cooperation, including the extension of the Nordic Investment Bank to cover the Baltics, has also been important. There are regular political consultations in a 5+3 format, or 5+3+1 with the United


\textsuperscript{82} Oldberg, as note 79 above. There have also been major bilateral exercises notably between Russia and Norway.

\textsuperscript{83} Oldberg, as note 79 above.

\textsuperscript{84} They joined as part of NATO’s ‘Big Bang’ enlargement, and also joined the EU, in 2004.
States, and parliamentary contacts between the Nordic and Baltic Councils. In August 2010, a 'wise men’s report' authored by Latvia’s former prime minister Valdis Birkavs and Denmark’s former defence minister Søren Gade made 38 proposals for new or strengthened Nordic-Baltic cooperation, of which five related to military defence and as many as twelve to societal security topics, including cyber-security.

On the face of it, while the Baltic States have a specific view of ‘hard’ security (notably in relation to Russia) that is not easily or naturally shared by the whole Nordic group, there should be more natural common ground on civil security challenges arising from transnational factors and shared management of the Baltic Sea. However, it is not always clear how much sense it makes for the Nordic-Baltic Eight to try to tackle these without Poland, Germany and Russia, ‘behind the back’ (as it were) of the region-wide frameworks just mentioned - the more so as many societal dangers like disease, pollution, crime and illegal migration flow into the Baltic from Russian territory. The Baltic States’ ‘hard’ preoccupations can reduce Nordic-Baltic systemic compatibility as they sometimes result in less political attention to, and sub-optimal organizational arrangements for, non-military risks and responses. Their political, social and welfare systems also have significant non-Nordic features, some stemming from deliberate policy choice, that help to explain why the Nordic states have never seriously considered admitting them to the Nordic Council (a separate Baltic Council was established instead). The pattern of societal risk for the 5 and the 3 diverges for these reasons as well as for obvious practical

87 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Kristmundur Þór Ólafsson, ‘Nordic–Baltic cooperation in civil security and emergency management: doing what comes naturally?’ in Robert Nurick and Magnus Nordenman (eds.), Nordic–Baltic security in the 21st century: the regional agenda and the global role, Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2011. This remark is not negated by the fact that Estonia has made a national speciality out of cyber-defence, and Lithuania out of energy security: the underlying national concerns in both cases are Russia-related, and the issues have been highlighted not least as a way for each state to profile itself within NATO, rather than as part of a comprehensive and integrated non-military risk analysis. (See also the works cited in notes 86 and 88.)
89 Language differences are also sometimes cited as a reason why bringing in the Balts would dilute the ‘kinship’ feeling of Nordic institutions and processes. On the one hand, this undoubtedly reflects deeper if less admissible Nordic feelings about a civilisational divide. One the other hand, it shows reluctance to admit that using English as the common language would also make Nordic work easier for many Finns and Icelanders (see main text, below).
ones, such as differences of size, climate and geography – Arctic civil emergencies are hardly a (direct) Baltic concern.  

In the longer-term perspective, therefore, the Wise Men’s initiative of 2011 might best be read as a step to pre-empt a ‘Northwestward drift’ in the Nordic agenda that, stimulated by Stoltenberg (and the broader Arctic debate) and generating more intense intra-Nordic cooperation, could risk stretching the sense of Nordic-Baltic fellowship too thin for both sides’ liking. If so – and with unexpected reinforcement from the Ukraine crisis - it may have succeeded in restoring a certain policy balance, and may also lead to some useful concrete results. The fact remains that useful common enterprises between the 5 and 3 in this field will often be better pursued through pan-Baltic or pan-European frameworks than by defining them exclusively as Nordic-Baltic business.

V.3 Arctic-wide Cooperation

A map centred on the North Pole is a useful reminder that the Nordic states’ most important neighbours include the USA and Canada as well as Russia. The former are not only crucial partners in Nordic defence, but also share experiences and concerns regarding the management of the polar seas, and comparable environmental, developmental and social issues linked to the needs of High Northern peripheries and the status of indigenous peoples. Since late Cold War times the full set of circumpolar states have been developing pan-Arctic cooperation – now enshrined in the institution of the Arctic Council (AC, 1996) – to address such shared concerns. At the same time and especially since the events of September 2001, the Nordic states have been more strongly drawn into a dialogue on non-warlike ‘new threats’ with the USA as a nation, and the community of democratic nations more broadly.

The pre-AC Arctic cooperation process focused strongly on environmental and human security, and these have remained at the centre of AC business as reflected not least in the Council’s sub-structure of six expert working groups. However, global climate politics and many of the national and global factors affecting human welfare in the Far North are demonstrably beyond the competence of the AC to manage and decide, however much it may hope to influence them through analysis and advocacy. In recent years as the challenges posed by potential new extractive, shipping, fishery, and touristic development in the High North have become clearer, the AC has shown a tendency to home in on issues where its members have not only shared interests

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92 The member states are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and the USA. Six indigenous peoples’ groups also sit in the AC as permanent participants.
but the power to make things happen. Thus, ideas for an Arctic shipping code aimed at safety and environmental responsibility were elaborated in the AC before being passed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), where the current aim is to produce legally binding regulations based upon them during 2014. In 2011 and 2013, the AC’s member states made two legally binding international agreements on cooperation (using both civil and military assets as needed) in search and rescue, and in rapid response to major oil-spills, respectively.\(^93\) It remains to be seen what if any further concrete cases may be found for such treatment: recent moves towards an interim fisheries protection agreement for newly-open Arctic waters have thus far been made not in the AC itself but by the five ‘littoral’ states – Canada, Denmark in respect of Greenland, Norway, Russia and the US.\(^94\)

This last point indicates one dividing line among the Nordic partners in their approach to the Arctic. Norway and Denmark value their place among the ‘Big Five’ who have substantial territories North of the Arctic Circle, while Iceland lies mostly below that line but also claims ‘littoral’ status, and Finland and Sweden have no Arctic coastlines. Iceland, Finland and Sweden have protested every time the Big Five have acted publicly together.\(^95\) Nevertheless, the Nordics have managed to sideline such irritations in the interests of a common approach to all substantial issues arising in the AC, strongly encouraged by the Nordic Council which has been arguing for a common Nordic Arctic ‘strategy’ for some years. The Nordic Council of Ministers has an observer seat at the AC, and there is a common Nordic funding programme for Arctic research, running for three years at a time (currently 2012-14).\(^96\) In 2006-12 Norway, Denmark and Sweden coordinated their goals for the AC chairmanship which they held successively in those years, focusing on climate change, integrated resource management, indigenous peoples, and management issues.\(^97\) They pushed together for establishing a permanent AC secretariat on the basis


\(^{94}\) See reportage at the Oceans North International website (Pew Charitable Trust): http://www.oceansnorth.org/campaign-updates-international.

\(^{95}\) Representatives of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, as autonomous nations within the Kingdom of Denmark, were also left out of these meetings and there has been friction especially between Nuuk and Copenhagen over the adequacy of their representation at the AC.

\(^{96}\) The Nordic Council, Sustainable development in the Arctic. Available at http://www.nordregio.se/Global/About%20Nordregio/Arktskt%20samarbetsprogram/2012-14/Nordisk_Minister%2c3%a5d_Program_for_arktis_2012-2014_ENGELSK.pdf. For more on these points see Bailes and Ólafsson, as note 81 above.

of a joint one they set up for their chairmanships, and this was agreed in 2012 – to start from January 2013 and be based in Tromsø, Norway.\footnote{Iceland had competed for the secretariat site but when it failed, was rewarded by providing the first Secretary-General (Magnús Jóhannesson).}

As we have seen, in the Haga framework of cooperation among executive agencies dealing with civil protection and emergency response, there is a growing focus - pushed especially by Iceland with its limited resources - on common risk assessment and closer cooperation in handling major Arctic incidents. This field may provide the main short-term opening for a further joint Nordic input to issues addressed and activities undertaken (such as training exercises) at pan-Arctic level; and it has no obvious political overtones that might give the larger AC members reason to complain of Nordic ‘ganging-up’. As for a joint Nordic strategy, the time does not seem quite ripe and the existing national Arctic strategies of the five states indicate considerable – though not insuperable – differences of emphasis.\footnote{Alyson JK Bailes and Lassi Heininen, \textit{Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A comparative analysis.} Reykjavik: University of Iceland Centre for Small State Studies 2012, available at http://ams.hi.is/sites/ams.hi.is/files/strategy_papers_pdf_singlepage.pdf.}

Where the idea of a joint strategy has already been agreed in principle is among the smallest local players, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes, in the framework of the West Nordic Council.\footnote{Egill Thor Nielsson, \textit{The West Nordic Council in the Global Arctic}, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies Working Paper 2014, available at http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/the_west_nordic_council.pdf.} Aside from the handicap of size in dealing with civil emergencies, they face comparable issues about possible new oil/gas extraction, large-power investment, new migration patterns, and the societal impacts of all these, which may be easier notably for the Greenlanders and Faroese to discuss without a Danish presence. As and when any joint West Nordic positions emerge, however, the natural first step in promoting them will be to seek broader Nordic support before trying to influence the whole AC, or any other larger forum.\footnote{Information from first co-author’s interviews in Tórshavn and Nuuk, March 2014. For background see also Alyson JK Bailes and Beinta í Jákupsstovu, ‘The Faroe Islands and the Arctic: Genesis of a Strategy’ in \textit{Stjórninál og Stjórnssýsla}, December 2013 edition, available at http://www.irpa.is/article/view/1228/pdf_294} Illustrating this point, during the latest Summit meeting of Nordic leaders at Akureyri, Iceland, the premiers of the Faroes and Greenland attended on the second day (27 May 2014) for a special discussion of Arctic goals.

Overall, the interface between Haga and pan-Arctic civil security cooperation seems stronger and simpler than the other two cases just examined, and may be the point where a conscious effort at coordination and ‘double value’ between the two frameworks would prove most rewarding. Given that military assets are openly included in the AC’s evolving emergency response plans (and military leaders of the eight member states have begun
meeting regularly to discuss implementation), this context might also be one where a bridge could be built between the military and non-military branches of new Nordic cooperation. It will be very interesting to see which, if any, of these lines of thought Denmark chooses to pursue under its promised Arctic sub-theme of Haga cooperation in 2015.

Since Canada is the current chair and the US the next chair (from 2015) of the AC, the Nordic states will find themselves talking more than usual to Ottawa and Washington about Arctic business between now and 2017. There has already, however, for some time been a significant traffic of ideas across the North Atlantic on civil protection and the handling of societal threats, boosted particularly by the US’s drive for dialogue and partnership after 9/11. Nordic experts found value in consultations and brainstorming with the Department of Homeland Security and other US authorities during this period of reappraisal, and arguably played no little part in keeping the bridge open across the Atlantic at some testing times in the 2000s. More recently, President Obama made a point of meeting all five Nordic leaders for a working dinner on 4 September 2013 during a visit to Sweden, and put emphasis on countering climate change which is both a soft security and an Arctic issue. Taken together with the British Premier David Cameron’s earlier initiative for a Nordic/Baltic leaders’ dinner on issue of modern governance, this underlines that the ability of the five states to function as a group can enhance their effectiveness in traditional diplomatic transactions 102 and in wider relationships, not just in the context of European institutions.

102 A practical example is the coordination of many promotional activities between the Nordic diplomatic missions in the US.
VI. FINAL ASSESSMENT:
HAGA AS A STRAND IN THE WEAVE
OF NORDIC COOPERATION

VI.1 Nordic needs, national responses

The Haga process is a very Nordic kind of cooperation both in its substantive rationale and its style. At bottom, what links it with the same countries’ ‘hard’ defence collaboration is the recognition of (a) similar challenges and (b) similarity or compatibility in responses, arising from cultural (historical, systemic) as well as practical factors. It further suits the interests of all five partners as ‘small’ states with limited resources, who cannot afford unnecessary duplication and whose best hope of international respect and influence often lies in a common front. What the stories of military and non-military security cooperation also have in common is a long historical build-up through bottom-up, sectoralized and voluntary action, including ‘soft’ harmonization through familiarity and imitation, finally gaining the chance to emerge at the level of overt high policy in post-Cold War conditions. The relevance of the latter lies not only in the freedom of manoeuvre gained by Western non-allied states such as Sweden and Finland, but in the new threat/risk patterns and threat/risk awareness patterns arising through wider engagement in both regional integration and globalization. The more that the Nordics open themselves to a wider Europe and the more that they seek advantages in a border-free world, the more they have to reckon with the vulnerability of small actors in a big game, and the more they should appreciate the value of local solidarity – even if the latter can never be their first-order defence against the most serious of threats (eg, the strategic asymmetry with Russia). Adding to this the general Western spectrum shift from traditional state security towards ‘softer’ functional issues and natural hazards including climate change – which the current Ukraine crisis may slow down, but surely not reverse – the timeliness of politicizing, regularizing and enhancing Nordic cooperation precisely in the area of event-focussed societal security is clear. If it had not happened at Haga in 2009, it would most probably have found another way.

At the start of this paper we suggested that, even if less ‘sexy’ than military cooperation, Haga cooperation in the end may mean more for Nordic citizens because it deals with contingencies that are highly likely or even certain to occur. We may now add
that its significance and potential impact are wider because ensuring societal security and effective emergency response are tasks for the ‘whole of government’, potentially engaging any and all state departments and agencies as well as all non-state actors in society. Here, however, we come to one of Haga’s most serious underlying conundrums. It is an enterprise of five ministries with different names and competences, meaning not only that civil security matters take up different spaces (and potentially different priorities) within their structures, but also that their own standing and ‘clout’ within national government systems are bound to vary. All of them have a prima facie interest – which Haga serves – in getting other government players to take their subject seriously. Our informants consistently saw too much ‘stove-piping’ (pursuit of specialized lines of action without inter-communication), and other authorities’ ignorance of civil protection requirements, as a danger.

Yet if a Nordic government as a whole becomes engaged, it will be all the more obvious that the one ministry with a ‘Haga’ mandate cannot actually speak for the whole topic – in the regional cooperation process or any other mode – either in practical or constitutional terms. In the first place, some important areas such as cyber-security, transport safety, environment-related safety standards, emergency stocks, and pandemic control are more likely than not to come under the purview of different ministries (and/or agencies). Help for citizens in societal emergencies abroad can hardly be contemplated without some foreign ministry involvement. Secondly, there is a tendency witnessed in all the countries (but perhaps most clearly in Sweden after the tsunami) to raise the responsibility for handling larger and more complex events to the level of Prime Ministers and Cabinets. When this happens, the Haga departments and agencies will at best be *primi inter pares* in supporting the coordination process; and depending on the nature of the emergency, they may not even be that.

This remark needs to be added to the observations already made in section IV above about the ambiguity of the Haga process’s own nature – campaign or permanent forum? – and about the sometimes counter-productive tug-of-war between its top-down and bottom-up dynamics. There are, however, some even more searching questions that might be posed about the foundations for Nordic cooperation in this field. When our informants were asked about similarities and differences that they saw when working together, the positive points cited were along the lines of the first paragraph above. Mention was made more than once of a ‘brotherly’ or ‘sisterly’ atmosphere. Lists of national differences were, however, also rather chillingly extensive and exact. One practitioner mentioned: administrative differences both in the horizontal spread of competences and in vertical arrangements - thus Finland does not have an MSB-type

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103 Olle Jonsson was also referred to as the ‘father’ of the process.
Sweden devolves more than most to local authorities; different threat and risk patterns/priorities due mainly to geography; different membership statuses in the EU and NATO; different attitudes on some key societal questions such as the perception of migration; and different attitudes to civil-military cooperation, especially regarding the military role. The seriousness of these factors and the way that they channel and limit the scope for Nordic consensus-forming at the everyday level are made abundantly clear in the two Oslo reports of 2014 discussed above (section IV.2).

Now, it might be argued that the Haga process itself is designed precisely to reach across such barriers and ultimately to lower them, through a combination of working-level socialization and high political will. But has it left (all) its participants feeling more brotherly and sisterly than before? Thanks to our informants’ frankness, it is clear that some perceptions of national variation have been sharpened by the Haga experience itself, while not all former misperceptions have been dispelled. The Danes and Finns are seen as utilitarian to the point of sometimes seeming close-fisted and minimalist, while they envy the Swedes and Norwegians for gaining access to almost unlimited resources following the tsunami and the Breivik case. Several other partners see the Icelanders as the least interested while the latter, as explained above, actually prize Haga highly as a showcase and support for their own security-policy evolution since 2006.

The sensitive issue of language becomes important here. Danish, Norwegian and Swedish speakers prize the chance to express themselves in their own idioms and their mutual comprehensibility is a reminder of ‘brotherhood’ in itself. Finnish and Icelandic participants, however, are obliged to use a second language and tend to find listening to Danish especially hard. This, as well as their geographically marginal locations (making real ‘cross-border’ cooperation impossible or limited to a few zones), probably contributes to the recurring perception of their somewhat marginal presence in Haga as well. It is understandable that after years of such experiences, some ‘core’ countries’ officials may start hankering after pressing ahead in some fields with less than five on board. Letting pioneer groups forge ahead has been a valid device in Nordic (eg, military) as well as EU cooperation in the past. Yet taking that relatively easy way out would mean giving up on one of Haga’s strongest new features, also reflected (as seen above) in NORDEFCO and the Stoltenberg report – the push for truly inclusive, pan-Nordic structures, as a

\[104\] Iceland does have such an agency under the name of Allmannavarnir but it does not take part in the Directors-General group, where the country is represented instead (mainly for ad hominem reasons) by the head of the Icelandic Construction Agency. All parties recognize that this arrangement is not a permanent solution.

\[105\] An obvious solution would be recourse to English, which is already the official language of NORDEFCO. The Scandinavian speakers are however reluctant (cf. note 86 above) and it is not certain that all Finnish participants would find it easier. The alternative of using interpreters has been necessary at some Ministerial events but would be expensive and cumbersome to apply throughout the working level.
precondition for equalizing security conditions within the region as well as for lasting international impact.

On the subject of inclusiveness, it is worth noting that the self-governing Nordic territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands do not have any separate or direct representation at Haga meetings (all levels), as they do for instance in the Nordic Council. They certainly all have potential civil emergency headaches and problems of capacity, and the Faroes and Åland especially have substantial delegated powers and relevant regulatory frameworks of their own. The issue of ‘cross-border’ assistance to Åland, whether from Finland or anywhere else, is made more complex by the de-militarization of that archipelago which its authorities interpret as forbidding the presence of uniformed personnel for any purpose. Greenland and the Faroes for their part are involved in the new enterprise of Arctic security and are keen, like Iceland, to attract Nordic interest and support especially for handling the increased accident and pollution risks that go with rising economic activity. Seen from outside, there would thus be a certain logic in involving their representatives in work on at least some Haga topics, as well as checking the future Haga agenda to see how far it does, or should, reflect their special vulnerabilities. Among our group of informants, however, a majority seemed quite firmly against introducing such a complication and would prefer to leave the responsibility for liaison with the metropolitan states (Denmark and Finland) concerned. If this remains the case, Iceland could of course also extend the conversation to Greenland and the Faroes through West Nordic cooperation at parliamentary and government levels.

Ultimately, the strengths and weaknesses of Haga cannot be separated from those that typify Nordic Cooperation as a whole. The latter have been authoritatively described as including a bottom-up dynamic combined with good political cover at higher level; a consensus method of policy building (=avoidance of confrontation and majority decisions); a low profile on the public stage, implying weak or non-existent awareness among the ordinary population; a ‘fragmented’ sector-by-sector approach; limited joint resources; and a rate of progress determined by the dialectic between ‘engineers’ of new


107 This issue has been under study both in the Åland parliament and in Helsinki in the context of a possible new security concept and risk assessment for the islands.

108 Again, one informant cited the language argument, though another pointed out that Greenland’s officials can always speak Danish and the Faroese, a kind of ‘Skandinavisk’.

109 See note 9 and section V.3 above.

cooperation and ‘gate-keepers’ who are not necessarily anti-Nordic, but concerned to protect their own professional remits. These features reflect in large part the need to accommodate – and willingness to respect - precisely those intra-Nordic differences, practical and attitudinal, that we have just discussed. It is also clear that they all perfectly fit the Haga process, at least to date. They place it methodologically in the mainstream of Nordic evolution, just as we have suggested wider Nordic connections for its underlying impulse and purposes.

For decades, such methods have served Norden’s interests well and played no little part in elevating this set of states to the economic, political and social model status that has so often – and again recently – been attributed to them. However, with the march of European, and wider, transnational integration since the Cold War’s end in particular, all Nordic countries to some degree have been drawn into international groups and processes – above all, the EU – that impose a different, legalistic, standardizing, intrusive mode of collaboration. We have seen specific EU demands of this kind impinging upon and driving certain aspects of Haga cooperation, for instance on HNS. We have seen the Nordics proposing to draw on pooled EU funds in cases where they, despite their wealth, are not willing to pool resources themselves. In section V.1 above we suggested that not many groups of Europeans, in such a situation, are likely to see Haga as an inherently superior methodology. As we return to this paper’s opening themes, we also have to ask where this leaves the relative importance of Nordic and wider European cooperation; and how fully one can ultimately rely on Haga even to fill the Nordic region’s own needs.

VI.2 In wider perspective

The question was raised quite early in our paper (section II.3) whether the factors demanding common action on civil emergency management, and societal security more broadly, actually operate most strongly at (sub-)regional level or across the whole European space. Is there a strong and specific sense of common security exposure and solidarity, for all hazards, among Nordic citizens today? Some factors suggest that, at least, there should be: notably the high levels of intra-Nordic migration, mutual investments, mutual trade, and growing integration of infrastructures in physically connected regions. Sympathy and interest from other Nordic states, when one suffers damage, is certainly a given; and some studies indicate a relatively short subjective ‘social distance’ from one Nordic society to another. Yet the practitioners with whom we raised the specific question of security awareness were none too sure about the answer. The kinds of national differences discussed in section VI.1 both affect popular feelings, and are affected by them insofar as national singularities express themselves through the political process. The resultant environment has, indeed, permitted developments - like Sweden’s national solidarity statement and the Nordic solidarity pledge of 2011 - that would have seemed out of reach even in the early 2000s. But it may be equally signifi-
cant that it has taken two decades after the Cold War’s end to advance this far, and that the three Nordic EU members had signed up already in 2007 to a Lisbon Treaty giving even more specific assurances to over 20 other Europeans.

What is clear, at any rate, is that the five-country Haga cooperation alone cannot be the complete answer to the legitimate and effective management of societal security, for any Nordic nation or the region as a whole. As shown in section V above and reflected especially strongly in the Oslo Ministerial proceedings, the Haga process needs the EU for stimulus and support just as much as it helps Norden to make a good showing on that stage. Nordic civil security cannot be complete, either, without improved civil security and event response throughout the Baltic region; a constructive modus vivendi with Russia on the relevant topics; and a peaceful, cooperative solution to the future challenges of the Arctic. In seeking these, the Nordics must also give thought to their profile and contribution within several other institutions beyond the EU.

In face of such realities, the question whether Haga is in any sense a ‘model’ for neighbours and for Europe is perhaps too simple and misplaced. First, the ability of any part of Europe to sustain and improve its performance in mastering its own security challenges – especially the non-military ones, which do not hinge on big-power transactions – is a necessary and valued contribution to the whole, almost regardless of how it is done. Secondly, if looking for Nordic inspiration to the work of civil protection and emergency management in Europe, we should distinguish between the ‘model’ or non-‘model’ character of particular (inter-) Nordic working methods, and the substantial lessons, experiences and influences that flow from Norden to Europe both through official and other channels. The very concept of societal security is a long-standing Nordic contribution111 that has made a - now very visible - impact on the action and discourse of the EU as a whole. Nordic ideas of preparedness, devolution, and resilience in the governance of risk can complete and balance more centrist or kinetic approaches from elsewhere. Advanced features of Nordic crisis intervention in the Western Balkans and more faraway crises have taught other states lessons that they realize (perhaps more clearly than some Nordics themselves) can also be applied at home. Most foreigners will remember the dignified response of the Norwegian establishment and people to the Breivik atrocity for longer than they will dwell on the shortcomings revealed in Norwegian police preparedness. Looked at in this light, the very fact of the Haga process and its declared principles may reinforce the general sense of good things coming out of Norden, and its specific outputs (now including modules?) can be reckoned to Norden’s

111 Albeit built on international academic foundations.
credit in Europe, even without the process needing to claim ground-breaking status or any particular methodological breakthrough.

Speculation on Haga’s own future is perhaps best approached in a similar way. None of our informants expected, or wanted, it to end in the near future. The products of the Oslo meeting – incidentally, attended for the first time by all five Directors-General - with the module initiative, further work on HNS, and the mandate to complete a strategic cooperation plan, have given plenty of material to chew upon. In section IV, we judged it too soon to be confident about the success of this approach in achieving a fully rational, comprehensive, and correctly prioritized blueprint for Nordic civil security cooperation. The methodological limits of the ‘samverkansanalys’ mirror the constricted roles (VI.1 above) of the Haga ministries themselves in the bigger picture of Nordic societal security; and the very method of cooperation, as just discussed, imposes its own parameters. Following Hanna Ojanen’s verdict on Nordic defence cooperation, however, we could also see these as the ‘best of the worst’ solutions whose modesty makes Haga possible in the first place. The question of whether results will be adequate for Norden’s own societal security needs, and for the Nordic input to a safer border-free Europe, is not one that can fairly be leveled at Haga alone. Other things are happening in Nordic thought and action on these issues and Nordic players are making international contributions in many other settings, not least as international officials and envoys. If the Haga process has succeeded at least in swelling this tide of advance and ensuring its medium-term continuation, that is maybe as much as we can reasonably ask.

The silent cooperation?

We cannot end this study without commenting on the curious lack of publicity for the Haga process and its achievements, both within the participating countries and abroad. It is true that the Ministerial meetings have been covered in short press releases, and Ministers have regularly reported the results to their own parliaments and to the Nordic Council. Contrary to some speculations that we heard, there does not seem any evidence of a wish to ‘hide’ the Haga process or deny opportunities for representative institutions to debate it. At the same time, at least until quite recently, it has been hard to find the original Haga documents online and official references to this cooperation in English (or another world language).

114 Indeed, the detailed ‘Strategic Development Plan’ adopted at the time of Haga II (see Annex Three) states: ‘It is also important to establish procedures for regular orientation reports to Nordic parliaments and the Nordic Council’. Our informants were clear, however, that they would not want a parliamentary presence in the actual decision making process; and some were uncomfortable with the demand made at the Nordic Council thematic session of April 2013 in Stockholm for a reporting obligation on Haga work.
115 A good selection in the original languages is now available at the Swedish website http://www.regeringen.se/
are even more scarce. This partly, but not wholly, explains the parallel observation that there has been very little journalistic or academic analysis of the project\textsuperscript{116} – and even less outside Norden - prior to our own research. We also came across some curious cases where ministerial officials had not handed down Haga conclusions and other documents to what would seem to be the logical lower-level contacts, nor circulated them within government.

Several explanations are possible, starting with the fact that public order authorities are not by nature outward-looking, and it is not natural or perhaps necessary for emergency responders to ‘advertise’ themselves in between emergencies. Nordic systems that delegate much responsibility to local authorities, and/or that handle the biggest hazards in a whole-of-government style with the ‘Haga’ ministry not always in the centre (as above), may also limit the extent to which one central ministry wishes to or can raise the public profile of the topic. Given the complex and de-centralized implementation process, it is not always easy to know ‘Who speaks for Haga?’. Externally, while the Nordic states clearly hoped Haga would let them tell a better story in Europe and other settings, the circumstances in which they actually tell that story or use it for leverage will differ nation-by-nation according to membership and other activity patterns. (The offer of a joint Nordic civil emergency module to the EU, if it succeeds, will be the strongest example so far of a ‘joint bid’.) Perhaps most convincing is the circular argument: the Haga Ministers and their officials did not expect much public interest at home or abroad,\textsuperscript{117} so they did not put much effort into cultivating it. The aim was, after all, more about walking the walk of improved mutual knowledge and cooperation than about talking the talk.

Does this lack of publicity and of independent study matter? Other areas of Nordic Cooperation, notably on defence, have made useful progress in the past under the cover of informality and with little or no publicity. In civilian crisis management, however, keeping (benevolent) non-state actors informed and mobilizing them for any new agreed goals would seem to be a matter of efficiency as well as transparency. The optimal approach is not just a ‘whole-of-government’ but a ‘whole-of-society’ one.\textsuperscript{118} The technological solutions for many of Haga’s intended breakthroughs will come from private industry and commercial research. In some Nordic countries at least, and at least in the ‘rescue’ phase, non-state volunteer movements are extremely important and need to be brought - for instance - into exercise plans. Reactions by the ordinary citizen can make all the difference to the much-advertised need for ‘resilience’ in both local and regional crises.

\textsuperscript{116}Honourable exceptions include Clive Archer, ‘The Nordic States and Security’ in Archer, Bailes and Wivel (op. cit. in note 26 above), and Malena Britz, op.cit. in note 18 above.

\textsuperscript{117}More than one of our informants complained that ‘No-one comes to the press conferences’.

Last but not least, Norden is no exception to the general rule that in globalized/globalizing conditions, non-state actors playing roles outside formal administrative structures can already lead a far more ‘border-free’ existence than their official and military cousins. The three buzz-words now figuring in Haga statements – ‘societal’ as well as ‘border-free’ and ‘robust’ – all suggest that there could be value in more actively informing, engaging, and even learning from non-state societal actors (including trans-Nordic groupings) from now on. Aside from anything else, success in such engagement should help to give the process the self-sustaining dynamism about which some of its participants do not seem fully confident as yet.

Finally, the test of whether more independent academic analysis can be helpful is one that this paper itself – in the first place - must meet. It does not claim, however, to be more than a ‘door-opening’ exercise, and its methodological limitations were admitted at the outset. The authors’ keenest hope is that it will stimulate greater attention to the topic, and frank debate on our provisional findings, both within the Nordic region and beyond.
ANNEX ONE: TEXT OF
‘HAGA I’ DECLARATION
(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

Nordic Ministerial Meeting
on Civil Protection and Emergency Preparedness
Stockholm, 27 April 2009

The responsible Nordic ministers with responsibility for civil protection and rescue services: Minister of Defence Sören Gade, Denmark, Minister of the Interior Anna Holmlund, Finland (represented by State Secretary Antti Pelttari), Minister of Justice Ragna Árnadóttir, Iceland (represented by Counsellor Dis Sigurgeirsdóttir), Minister of Justice Knut Storberget, Norway, and Minister of Defence Sten Tolgfors, Sweden, met in Stockholm and held discussions on Nordic cooperation in the field of civil protection and emergency preparedness.

These discussions have been productive and we see great value in developing the existing Nordic cooperation in the fields of civil protection and emergency preparedness. Common values and cultural and geographical closeness provide an important foundation for cooperation. It is our conviction that a deeper and better focused cooperation will benefit the whole Nordic region, and can strengthen our potential for acting in various international contexts.

Similar developments are taking place in our Nordic countries in the area of civil protection and emergency preparedness. The common and over-arching aim for us all is to prevent and limit the consequences that may flow from major accidents, natural disasters and other societal emergencies.

At this first meeting between ministers with responsibility for civil contingencies and rescue services, we have agreed on further developing Nordic cooperation by jointly
exploring in detail, and taking concrete measures in, the following fields for deeper cooperation.

**Rescue Services**
On the basis of existing Nordic cooperation, test alternative ways of developing Nordic rescue service cooperation. One aim could be for this cooperation to embrace a broader perspective of civil protection and preparedness.

**Exercises and Training**
Review ongoing training and exercise activities in the various countries with the aim of promoting increased Nordic participation in individual countries' training courses and exercises. It may also be considered whether international exercises could provide a basis for strengthened intra-Nordic exercise cooperation.

**CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) preparedness**
Develop capacities for preventing, detecting and handling events involving CBRN materials by including these issues in exercises and training, in research work, in cooperative technological and materials development, and in cooperation in acute emergencies.

**Crisis Communication with the Population**
Evaluate the existing informal cooperation on crisis portals to see how far this cooperation could possibly be formalized, extended to other Nordic countries, and could focus further on the communications aspect of the portals.

**Use of Volunteers**
Hold a workshop attended by Nordic civil emergency authorities and volunteer organizations with a view to exchanging experiences on, and further developing, the use of volunteers as part of society's collective preparedness.

**Research and Development**
Prepare an overall picture of ongoing relevant research and development in the Nordic states where it is currently conducted, and offer proposals
on joint Nordic activities and projects that could be defined and eventually carried out.

We shall continue to develop our Nordic cooperation by following up this work and holding further discussions of the same kind, normally twice a year. The next meeting will take place in Norway.

The Nordic working group of departmental officials will follow up and coordinate the related work and will report on it to the next Ministerial meeting.
This Declaration is the basis of political considerations among ministers in Sweden (Minister of Defence), Norway (Minister of Justice and Public Security), Denmark (Minister of Defence), Finland (Minister of the Interior) and Iceland (Minister of the Interior) who work with the rescue preparedness in preventing and responding to serious emergencies. An important foundation for this cooperation is provided by the countries’ common values, their openness and their cultural and geographical closeness, together with the desire to develop and strengthen each country’s robustness dynamically for tackling serious accidents and emergencies. The first declaration of this kind was adopted in April 2009 at Haga Slott in Sweden.

The Nordic countries share to a high degree the threats, risks and vulnerabilities that are the starting point for efforts to develop an effective crisis management system. Basic similarities in social structures play a part in this. An interconnected infrastructure in many spheres adds to the potential but also increase the interdependence between the countries.

In Nordic countries, crisis preparedness is a responsibility shared by many actors, including the government but also official agencies, local authorities, business enterprises and the individual citizen.
Experience shows that serious accidents and crises have had a direct impact on the way that efforts for preparedness and security have developed in the Nordic region. They have played their part in the Nordic countries identification of needs for improvement and highlighted the importance of cross-border cooperation to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and draw lessons from actual events. Cooperation also draws upon a common learning process and the possibility to streamline developments among the countries following such incidents.

The goal of cooperation is a robust Nordic region, in terms of capacities to prevent, withstand, recover from and learn from accidents and crises. Nordic cooperation in the fields of societal security and crisis management aims to create a region free of frontiers. Exchanging national or Nordic-level experiences gained before, during and after an accident or crisis is therefore an important element in Nordic cooperation. Efforts must also be made to pre-empt and limit the consequences of accidents and natural disasters. Cooperation should contribute to cost-effectiveness. The countries’ ability to work together, both operationally and politically, in various international settings also creates new opportunities for joint capacity-building and joint interventions.

The ‘Haga’ cooperation aims to guide and strengthen society’s preparedness for resisting and responding to serious accidents and crises. An important aspect of this is to continually review, define and prioritize specific areas for cooperation.

The Nordic ‘solidarity’ declaration (of 2011) made public the possibility of mutual help in the event of a Nordic country being hit by a disaster. That declaration of intent constitutes a starting point for related Nordic cooperation.

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The annual ministerial meetings held as part of the ‘Haga’ cooperation take place with a chairmanship and secretariat rotating among the Nordic countries. Each meeting ends by formulating conclusions that register the political will for the continuous cooperation, and serve as a basis for informing respective parliamentary bodies about progress in relevant Nordic cooperation.

The working group of Nordic departmental officials works to ensure the necessary coordination both at national level and among the Nordic countries, with a view to achieving continuous progress in these efforts. The group is also working on producing a joint orientation and overview of the fields of cooperation in the form of a multi-year action plan.
Concrete Nordic cooperation on society’s crisis readiness needs to be developed in a flexible way within the already existing cooperation frameworks. This underlines the importance of close cooperation among the concerned departments and responsible authorities as work proceeds.
Background and Points of Departure

Nordic cooperation is among the oldest and most comprehensive regional cooperation arrangements in the world. The cooperation is grounded in trust and confidence among the Nordic nations. Common values, cultural resemblances, openness between the countries and the will for dynamic development form an excellent foundation for working together. The Nordic countries’ history is also closely interwoven. Geographical proximity helps to ensure that the countries are co-dependent on each other and have an increasingly interlinked infrastructure.

The drive to strengthen the various countries’ robustness in the event of societal crises also reinforces the sense of common purpose. There are, further, great similarities in the threats, risks and vulnerabilities that underlie national work on crisis management. In our complex modern society, central services such as electricity production, information sharing, health care and transport must be capable of surviving major incidents. Cooperation presupposes a common learning process and coordinated development in the light of past societal crises. The Nordic countries have long been working to enhance their joint capacity for pre-empting and handling accidents, other serious emergencies
and crises. This cooperation involves many different fields and activities, with a focus i.a. on health care provision, rescue services, and electricity supply.

The Nordic countries also work together at international level. Nordic cooperation should be seen as part of European policy, providing added value in the formation of European civil emergency management policies. Nordic cooperation in the sphere of crisis management can further be strengthened as a sub-region within Europe.

In the Nordic solidarity declaration (of 2011), the possibility of mutual aid in the event of a Nordic country being hit by a catastrophe was publicly affirmed. This declaration of intent provides the starting-point for relevant Nordic cooperation.

Haga’ Cooperation

Political intentions regarding society’s readiness for avoiding and tackling societal crises were formulated in April 2009 when the first declaration was adopted at Haga Slott in Sweden. The declaration has contributed to a growing focus on joint Nordic capacities to withstand and manage accidents and crises. A number of projects have been launched in the fields of rescue services, preparedness for CBRN (chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear) incidents, crisis communications, volunteer activity, exercises, training, research and development, and have created a good foundation for further work.

Subsequently, an increasing need has been felt for a more over-arching, political statement of intent in the form of an updated and more ambitious Haga declaration: the so-called Haga II, adopted in June 2013.

The Haga II declaration states that a strategic development plan must be created for the next phase of work. The development plan will give concrete form to the declaration and is designed to provide longer-term guidelines for ongoing efforts.

Vision, Goals and Priorities for Cooperation

The goal of Nordic cooperation on societal security and preparedness is a Nordic region free of frontiers.

A robust Nordic region needs good capacities for pre-empting and handling serious emergencies. It also needs good capacity to recover after such events. Nordic robustness
implies a common ability to cope with everything from terrorist threats and cyber-attacks to catastrophes caused by weather and other natural disasters.

A stronger, more focused cooperation will benefit the whole Nordic region and increase the chances of giving and receiving mutual help, as well as acting together in European and other international contexts. By finding shared solutions, every country can strengthen its own national crisis management capacity at the same time as enhancing the Nordic and international potential for cooperation.

In Haga cooperation, it is important to continually identify, analyse and prioritize the key fields of collaboration. With a dynamic development over time, Nordic cooperation on societal security will become more systematic and result-oriented.

Cooperation aims at improving crisis management before, during and after a major event. This is achieved i.a. by taking measures to prevent, withstand, handle, recover from and learn from societal crises. If the Nordic states increase their collaboration in an international context, the impact they have there will also be greater.

The goals and guidelines for Haga cooperation are to:
- strengthen the exchange of experience and knowledge between countries
- strengthen efforts to pre-empt and limit the consequences of societal crises
- develop possibilities for building joint capacities and joint interventions
- strengthen the ability to act, both politically and operationally, in various international contexts.

To achieve the over-arching goals, specific areas for cooperation must be prioritized according to the following criteria.

Priority will be given to aspects that
1. contribute to a Nordic region without frontiers by removing various cross-border obstacles that hinder common actions or mutual help during emergencies;
2. help to reduce various kinds of vulnerability, particularly those with trans-frontier effects;
3. help to increase collective capabilities;
4. contribute to cost-effectiveness by economies of scale and by division of competences among the countries; and
5. promote greater common strengths in Europe and in international fora.
The Haga cooperation is governed and pursued on the basis of the declaration, the strategic development plan, and (ministers’) conclusions.

1. The declaration provides the political will for cooperation at an over-arching level.
2. The strategic development plan concretizes the declaration and identifies goals, processes and time-lines for pursuing work at a strategic level.
3. The conclusions after each ministerial meeting indicate what the nations want to do together by evaluating the ongoing cooperation and giving directions for further work.

Concrete cooperation, i.e. working out how to realize the political will within a given strategic framework, takes shape at the level of the competent authorities. The regular meetings of directors-general (responsible for civil crisis management) provide a hub for this concrete cooperation, and the directors-general report up to the strategic/political level.

**Strategic Areas for Development 2013-15**

**Nordic cooperation audit**

To illuminate what is needed for strengthening Nordic crisis management work, a three-phase blueprint is provided here for a Nordic cooperation audit, designed to result in a planning system for Nordic preparedness cooperation and a concrete-goal-oriented plan for further development. Responsibility will reside at agency level for carrying through this development work.

**Phase 1**

The first phase will comprise an evaluation, inventory, analysis and selection of areas for Nordic cooperation. A rolling evaluation and analysis needs to be made of already-existing cooperation, together with an assessment of remaining needs. Areas where the deepening of existing cooperation would be desirable and possible must then be prioritized. Prioritization is also needed among demands in areas where new cooperation would be desirable and possible.

**Phase 2**

When the inventory and prioritization are finished, directions or a road-map must be provided for the agreed areas of cooperation. A process also needs to be set up for
reporting back and for follow-up within given time-limits. It is also important to establish procedures for regular orientation reports to Nordic parliaments and the Nordic Council.

Phase 3

In phase 3 a planning system will exist for Nordic preparedness cooperation, along with a concrete and goal-oriented action plan for further development.

Coordinated development of practical conditions for mutual aid in accord with the Nordic solidarity pledge and European guidelines on host nation support

The practical conditions for aid need to be developed in accord with the Nordic solidarity pledge of April 2011 and the EU’s guidelines on host nation support of June 2012 (SWD(2012)169 final). The capacity to receive support and assistance in a coordinated way, in the event of serious accidents and crises in the Nordic region, needs to be strengthened. The prerequisites for advance planning, coordination, logistics, and legal and financial issues must be clarified. Responsibility will reside at agency level for carrying through this development work.

The possibility of mutual aid in the event of a Nordic country being hit by a catastrophe has been publicly affirmed in the Nordic solidarity declaration. This declaration of intent provides the basis, together with the need for national strategies and implementation of European guidelines on host nation support, for continued development of a more coordinated capacity for absorbing support and aid in the Nordic region.

Existing frameworks like NORDRED, and development projects already carried out including the Nordic EU project ‘Cross-border’ which was executed in 2010-2011 in the context of the rescue-services provisions in the Haga declaration, will provide the foundation for this work.

NORDRED is an agreement on rescue services cooperation among the Nordic states and is designed as a supplement to other multi- or bilateral agreements in the field. The agreement makes it possible for the responsible authorities in Nordic countries to work together with a view to facilitating assistance for emergencies in peacetime, so as to speed up the deployment of personnel and equipment.

The aim of the Cross Border project was to explore the possibilities for continued development of Nordic cooperation on rescue and preparedness in a broad perspective.
The guiding principle was that cooperation should be made as simple and effective, and should be as much ‘without frontiers’, as possible.

The conclusion drawn from the EU Cross Border project was that the juridical conditions for cooperation on civil protection and preparedness among Nordic states need to be improved, and that there is need for continued dialogue. A revision of the NORDRED agreement was one possible alternative mentioned; a parallel agreement would be another potential solution. Further, important areas where the conditions could be improved were identified. These concerned legal, structural and functional prerequisites as well as the conditions for improving knowledge and awareness.

**Division of Labour**

Under the Haga cooperation, the responsible ministers meet every year for political deliberations. The chairmanship rotates among the Nordic states and each meeting closes with the adoption of conclusions.

The group of Nordic departmental officials works to ensure the necessary coordination both at national level and between the Nordic states. The high officials will pursue the development plan in close cooperation with the ministries and responsible agencies concerned.

Concrete Nordic cooperation is carried forward within already existing channels of cooperation. It is thus important to maintain close collaboration between the ministries concerned and the responsible agencies as work proceeds.

**Time-plan for completing the work 2013-15**

The Haga II declaration and strategic development plan have been agreed at the ministerial meeting of June 2013.

The evaluation of existing cooperation in the framework of Haga I, and the inventorying of current Nordic collaboration in the field of preparedness and of new requirements, will be carried out by the agencies concerned who will also propose a prioritization. The starting-point for an inventory of new requirements could for example be the various nations’ risk and vulnerability assessments. The ministerial meeting will take decisions on which modes of cooperation should be prioritized and on the over-arching aims for
this field. The first phase of the inventory and prioritization is to be completed in time for the next ministerial meeting in 2014.

The ministries, led by the group of high officials, will develop a process for reporting back and will set the timings for completing various activities under a comprehensive plan. The reporting-back procedures and deadlines need to be synchronized i.a. with work within the EU and other international fora, to allow for synergy effects. Improving oversight and follow-up is a very important aspect of the task, as it allows a more strategic, long-range, and needs-driven style of activity.

A functioning planning system and an action plan for Nordic emergency management cooperation must be in place at the latest in 2015.

The practical conditions for assistance in line with the solidarity declaration and EU guidelines for host nation support are to be developed within the same time period.
At the meeting of Nordic ministers with responsibility for societal security and civil emergency management at Vaxholm in 2013, the ministers agreed on a further deepening of Nordic cooperation through the Haga II declaration.

In line with Haga II, the vision for Nordic cooperation in societal security and civil emergency management is ‘a robust Nordic region without borders’. The aims are to work for reducing the nations’ vulnerability, for a stronger shared response capacity, and for greater cost-efficiency; and to achieve a greater common impact in Europe and international fora. On the basis of these aims, two important studies have been carried out since the Vaxholm meeting:

- A Nordic cooperation analysis, which makes clear what further work is needed to strengthen societal security and civil emergency management in the Nordic countries;
- Improved possibilities for assistance within the Nordic region (Host Nation Support). This study is a step towards developing the practical requisites for assistance between the countries in accord with the Nordic solidarity declaration and the EU’s guidelines for Host Nation Support.

The proposals in the cooperation analysis together with the development of the requisites for Host Nation Support provide a common foundation for making the Nordic region more robust. Today we have adopted a new orientation that will contribute greatly to the execution of joint emergency response operations and to the practice of mutual help in crisis situations. The ministers note the progress made in the work on Host
Nation Support, and call on the nations to continue their efforts, as required, in line with the reports’ recommendations.

It has been decided to establish joint Nordic modules, thereby enhancing the possibilities for joint Nordic operations. Intervention modules specifically designed for Nordic needs can be included in the EU’s pool of civil emergency response capacities; they can be used in the context of mutual assistance in the case of disasters in Nordic countries, and thus contribute to implementing the Nordic solidarity declaration of 2011. As needed, relevant exercises will be carried out on Host Nation Support and joint modules.

These measures are an important step forward in Nordic cooperation in the field of societal security and civil emergency management, and will help to fulfil the goals of Haga II.

The group of Nordic departmental officials, in close cooperation with the relevant national civil protection authorities, will ensure that the work is carried forward and will coordinate action vis-à-vis the European Commission. A joint recommendation report will be prepared for the ministerial meeting in Denmark in 2015.

Based upon the Vaxholm meeting of 2013, it was decided to start work towards a common Nordic development plan for Haga cooperation and a concrete action plan with actions, deadlines and end-goals. Results of this work will be presented at the ministerial meeting in Denmark in 2015.
a) From the ‘Nordisk Samverkansanalys’ (audit of Nordic Cooperation), pp. 8-21

1. A joint Nordic module

This joint intervention capacity would build on and combine a set of specific Nordic assets within the framework of existing bilateral and regional agreements on civil emergency response. If compliant with EU specifications, the module could further be offered as part of the EU’s latest civil protection capacities programme and might attract EU funding; and it could be used for crisis assistance abroad. Such a module would be a more modest, focussed version of the proposal in Stoltenberg’s February 2009 report for a ‘Nordic disaster unit’ – which implied a structure capable of coordinating all disaster aid deployments. It is not yet clear what the module should best focus on, but three ideas mooted are: a ‘Cold Conditions’ unit embracing for instance local S&R capacities; a unit/pool/network for cross-border response to CBRN events; and a combined MEDEVAC capacity.

2. Strengthening Nordic research cooperation

The idea here is to make research and development more cost-effective and goal-oriented through joint and coordinated approaches. A group of Nordic civil emergency officials could for instance review existing research and draw researchers’ attention to gaps and priority areas, such as more work on fire risks; they could advise and support researchers in getting EU funding, thus also enhancing the Nordic R+D contribution in Europe. Another good area for a joint approach would be risk analysis and future scenarios. However, it is not yet clear
whether such a coordination effort would best be subsumed within present joint research frameworks such as NordForsk’s current Societal Security programme, or if it should be led by a separate officials’ group (as above) – or maybe a combination of both.

3. A Joint Nordic exercise

While many multilateral civil emergency exercises already take place in Norden, there is no exercise framework that involves all five Nordics and them alone. Such an event could help notably in understanding differences in national processes and procedures, and assessing their compatibility. However, the technique of the exercise itself and especially the production and use of ‘lessons learned’ would have to be fully agreed in order to derive full Nordic benefit. It is not yet clear whether extensions of existing exercises could meet the need or if it is worth funding a separate exercise. The latter’s cost-effectiveness might be clearer if it was used to test some other aspect of desired Nordic progress (eg a response ‘module’ or cross-border Host Nation Support), and/or if it was declared to and part-financed by the EU.

b) From ‘Förbättrade möjligheter för stöd inom Norden’ (Host Nation Support report), pp. 18-27

1. Advance Planning

1.1 A standing Nordic experts’ group on HNS made up of officials at agency level.

1.2 Coordinated development of HNS expertise: even if it is hard for each Nordic state to have an identical ‘HNS cell’ acting as a point of contact and support for incoming emergency helpers – for instance because some would place this function at central, and some at local level – it makes sense for each state’s designated experts in HNS liaison and management to know each other and exchange experiences. While all states are still working on their HNS expertise ‘pool’, a first step would be to invite other Nordic representatives to a Norwegian HNS training event planned for 2015.

1.3 HNS aspects of exercises: in the general Haga effort for better coordinated and focused civil emergency exercises, including the handling of lessons learned, HNS aspects should be fully and coherently integrated. Sweden is for instance seeking EU funding for an HNS exercise in 2017.

1.4 Cooperation in risk and capacity assessment: ongoing work on joint risk analysis could be extended – also as an input to EU policy-making – by also comparing assessments of capability, and developing a joint assessment approach to cross-border incidents and those requiring international help.
2. Coordination

2.1 Deeper cooperation among Nordic officials: this is particularly important among those involved in the 24/7 readiness system (TiB personnel), who may have a crucial role in giving Nordic neighbours a picture of crisis conditions or of periods of more general vulnerability, thus allowing assistance options to be examined fast. TiB contact points should know each other and have means of instant phone and e-mail communication 24/7. They could take the initiative in proposing Nordic meetings to discuss generic or ad hoc challenges. Bilateral job exchanges between these officials could be considered.

2.2 Situational Awareness: this is important for understanding events and their implications and also identifying capacities and options for response. Sharing of situational awareness in Nordic emergencies with cross-border effects should be facilitated as a sub-set of the TiB contact-points’ work. Techniques and systems used would need to be clarified, and ways must be found to overcome national definitional and procedural differences, eg by direct human contact (video conferencing).

3. Logistics

3.1 Points of Entry: in response to EU and other international requirements, the Nordic states are moving towards mapping the entry points (border crossings, airports etc) that could be used for bringing in external assistance in various contexts. Without attempting an over-complex grand Nordic chart, the nations should inform each other and look for chances of coordination eg in jointly identifying the primary intra-Nordic crossing points.

3.2 Communications: the aim here is an ‘Inter System Interface’ that makes the different Nordic countries’ TETRA emergency communications systems interoperable, so that personnel working across borders can communicate both with their own national networks and their hosts’. Norway and Sweden are already planning to exercise this between their respective systems and the effort should be a Nordic-wide one. It will require agreement on authentication, encryption etc as well as compatibility of hard- and soft-ware. Cooperation as regards communication with the population should also accompany such cross-border actions, and is linked with the handling of situation assessment.

4. Legal and Financial Issues

(Financial problems must basically be tackled at national level, though the five states could inform each other about their experiences in solving them.)

4.1 Reviewing the framework for societal security and civil emergency management: while a multitude of inter-Nordic agreements exist on civil emergency actions, it is not
always clear which legal base to use in a specific case, and some legal obligations (such as labour rights) have not yet been taken into account. The EU-supported Cross Border review highlighted gaps in the legal framework, for example in the case of large cross-sectoral actions that do not fit the definition ‘rescue’; or in post-crisis activities when the rescue phase is over; or when pre-positioning people and/or resources to deal with an anticipated hazard. NORDRED experts have opined that the NORDRED agreement as such does not need revision. Thought should be given to developing a broader inter-Nordic agreement that would cover a wider sectoral range and wider variety of potential assistance.
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